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Technology has a decisive influence on the daily lives
of most of the world population. Historically, technology
has moved from one part of the world to another by a
continuous process of transfer.
However, the resultant transference has been quite
uneven in its geographical impact, and there is a concern
that the "technology gap" between the developed countries
and the less-developed countries is widening.
Concern about the widening of the gap and the need to
increase the technology transfer process, is the very
essence of the economic growth and development needs of
less-developed countries.
This Thesis will examine this gap, and an attempt will
be made to determine guidelines, initiatives, and mechanisms
to facilitate the transfer of U.S. technology to Latin
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I. INTRODUCTION
Peru and Venezuela, because of their geographical
position, have traditionally been greatly influenced by the
United States (cultural, economical and technological) both
in the civilian and military environment.
Historically also, Peruvian, Venezuelan and most of the
Latin American military, have a very active political
participation. As it is widely known they have occupied the
presidency of their countries during long periods since the
independence wars
.
This political participation has given them the
opportunity to study and participate actively in development
programs where technology plays a leading role, both in the
military and civilian environment.
On the other hand, the constant and increasing presence
of officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force in Technical,
General Staff, War Colleges and Postgraduate Schools in the
United States, as well as contacts with the U.S. Military
Missions and Mobile Training Groups in these countries, has
given the Peruvian and Venezuelan military commands a good
perspective of the existing technological gap and the need
to implement an adequate transfer of technology process not
only to the Armed Forces but most of all to civilian
10
organizations and enterprises, both government and private,
in order to reach their national development goals.
But the crux of the problem in this technology transfer
process between the United States of America and
Latin-American countries is the ever-widening impasse that
has resulted from the growing gap between Latin-American
demands for technology and the inadequate supply response of
U.S. enterprise groups.
This Thesis addresses this problem as well as the
continuing set of issues between the United States and
Latin-American countries over the transfer of technology
processes. Many of the problems and barriers for the
implementation of adequate programs in Peru and Venezuela,
apply in varying degrees to other Latin-American countries
and to newly industrializing nations of the Third World.
At issue is the basic conflict between emerging national
objectives in Peru and Venezuela, Latin-America and
elsewhere to utilize the technology factor as a pivotal
element of national economic growth and development and
representatives of the United States business enterprises
who feel harassed and threatened by the new policies and
their impact on commercial corporations in these countries
.
In particular, United States firms with equity
investments or licensing arrangements object to what they
consider as infringements on their industrial property
11
rights and upon their latitude to manage commercial
operations
.
Peru, Venezuela and other Latin-American countries are
pressing for the restructure of the Technology Transfer
environment at both the national and international levels.
Along with other developing countries they are seeking to
establish an international binding code of conduct to govern
transnational enterprise relationships.
The tendency in this area of controversy has been to
engage in mutually incriminating and often acrimonious
dialogue, rather than to seek positive and mutually
advantageous solutions. Part of the problem lies in a
failure on the part of the United States to fully understand
and appreciate the new set of development policies
underlying the drive toward greater technological
independence and self-sufficiency. On the other hand, in
Peru and Venezuela and in almost all Latin-American
countries, there has been an unwillingness to accommodate to
the commercial realities relating to the management of
technology assets from the supplier's viewpoint.
Commingled with the commercial consideration of United
States enterprises are broader questions of United States
international trade and technical assistance involving its
Peruvian and Venezuelan neighbors. These economic and
political considerations must also be factored into adjusted
12




The alternative is to run the risk that the perceived
impasse between United States commercial and economical
interests and Peruvian and Venezuelan national development
goals will deteriorate into a mutually destructive political
and economic confrontation. The way lies open to reformulate
the trade and commercial relations so that they continue to
benefit segments of the United States economy, while at the
same time respond to the emerging aspirations and
perspectives of Peruvian and Venezuelan societies.
The overview and analysis of the shift in Peruvian and
Venezuelan policies, and the new types of arrangements that
United States firms are entering should prove useful to
involve segments of the United States business community for
the formulation of its foreign policy toward Peru and
Venezuela and the rest of the Latin- American countries.
The enlarged demand for industrial technology on new
terms, coupled with continuing efforts by Peruvian and
Venezuelan economies to expand exports of manufactured goods
to the United States and other world markets, poses new
challenges for adjustment and accommodation between United
States policy regarding domestic production and employment
and international relationships with newly industrializing
nations like Peru and Venezuela.
This thesis provides an examination of the Technology
Transfer Process and its importance in Peruvian and
14
Venezuelan national economic development, that applies to
both civilian and military environments, the measures
recommended to enhance their technological absorptive and
self -generating capabilities, and some insight, guidelines,
and recommendations on the nature and direction these
adjustments and accommodations might take, based upon mutual
interests and advantage in order to make Technology Transfer
a mutually beneficial process for the United States of
America, Peru and Venezuela.
15
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIETY
A. INTRODUCTION
Technology Transfer, is a process that has strong links
with the culture and the characteristics of every society.
Therefore it is the intention of the authors to make an
analysis that will cover the most relevant aspects of the
Latin American Society, and of two specific countries, Peru
and Venezuela. The following aspects will be covered:
1. Origin and Evolution of the Latin American Society
2. Today's Society
3. Religious Characteristics
4. Major Types of Latin-American Executives
B. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION
Latin American Society is a mixture of three races
White, Indian and Negro. Although ethnic background was an
important criterion of status in colonial times, it became
less so as "mestizaje" (the genetic mixing involving various
combinations of any of the three) made distinguishing
between racial types increasingly difficult. Eventually,
ethnic categories came to be regarded as points along a
continuum rather than as discrete entities, and physical
appearance and skin color became a major criteria for
determining status. Even though this area has proven
16
conflicting in many other countries, in Peru and Venezuela
no national census has classified the countries according to
ethnicity
.
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the territory
that is present-day Venezuela and Peru were inhabited by
indians of different groups of widely varying cultures and
linguistic affiliations.
The Spanish conquest resulted in a rapid and widespread
extermination of indigenous groups. There are no reliable
statistics available and hence it is impossible to estimate
the loss of indian life in the first years of Spanish rule.
Those that survived were subjected to economical and
political control and converted to Christianity. Mission
outposts were founded by various religious orders. A system
that dispersed groups of Indians and forcibly resettled them
in accessible towns under the supervision of church
authorities was known as "reducciones" (reductions). Under
another system, the "encomienda" (in charge of), individual
colonists were given the right to collect tribute from
Indians within a specific territory in return for
undertaking their religious conversion. Each of these
systematic methods of pacification made a profound cultural
impact on the native people.
By the end of the sixteenth century, the role of the
Indians in the national ethnic structure had been fully set
and the previously most populous tribes were virtually
17
extinct, their surviving members subject to bondage under
the Spaniards [Ref. 1]
.
As the agricultural economy flourished, and the indian
population diminished, the colonist turned to importing
African slaves to meet their needs for a cheap source of
labor. Large numbers of slaves were imported from many
ethnolinguistic groups in the sixteenth to the seventeenth
centuries
.
Although in many instances the black slaves were
mistreated and worked under inhuman conditions, they had a
social and legal status that was vastly different from the
slaves in British colonies. Whereas a slave in North America
was considered the absolute property of the master, who
could not be held responsible before law for any
mistreatment, the Spanish colonial system provided several
means of recourse for a slave who felt ill used. Homicide
and physical cruelty to a slave were legally punishable,
even if commited by the master. In addition, any slave who
established that he had been badly treated could demand in
court that he be sold to another master. And, whereas Anglo
American law held that a slave had no civic rights -being
the equivalent legally of a nonperson-Spanish American law
gave him the right to contract for binding marriage and to
own, bequeath, and dispose of property. In general, Spanish
colonial law encouraged manumission, the act of releasing
18
from slavery or servitude; whereas North American law was
designed to discourage the freeing of slaves [Ref. 2].
The result of this legal and social tradition of slavery
was the rapid growth of a population of freedmen working as
manual laborers in the cities or living as peasants on
marginal lands.
From the outset Venezuelan and Peruvian social
structures were static and rigidly stratified along classes
and color lines developed under the influence of Hispanic
values and the Roman Catholic Church. A small number of more
or less pureblood white occupied the top rung of the social
ladder by virtue of their status as landlords and preservers
of the Hispanic heritage. This heritage stressed the
importance of the patriarchal extended family, the primacy
accorded individual uniqueness and dignity, the disdain for
manual work, and the distinction between the roles of males
and females. Machismo, the complex of beliefs and attitudes
that came to define masculinity, stressed chivalry,
virility, courage and daring, and played an important part
of both countries socio-political development. It was a
vital ingredient in the personality of caudillos who
governed after independence and today is a deeprooted value
in the society.
A small middle stratum was made up of less successful
whites and those mestizos who were able to gain some
19
education or wealth. Engaged as clerks, traders, teachers
and petty bureaucrats or in the forms of nonmanual workers,
members of the middle stratum usually lived in urban areas
and emulated the values and behavior of the upper class as
closely as they could.
The lower class was rural and largely undifferentiated;
the majority of its members were poor peasants, usually of
pure or mixed Indian or African descent, and their
lifestyles reflected the amalgam or cultures they inherited.
20
Hispanic influence was found at the structural or
institutional levels in such things as local government, the
Spanish language and the Catholic Religion. Restricted by
skin color and poverty, and frequently by law, the lower
class could not fully adopt all the values and behavior
patterns of the upper class and so formed a folk culture
that differed in several aspects. Among those, the
matriarchal system was chosen instead of the patriarchal.
As time evolved, both usage and law reinforced the
rigidity of the social structure and the distance between
the classes, where the whites considered themselves to be
innately superior to their non white compatriots and took
every possible measure to maintain social distance. But in
the eighteenth century, Spain's crown began selling
"dispensas de color" (color dispenses) which allowed their
purchasers to enjoy the prerogatives and status of white
men, regardless of social background. From here stems a
widely used proverb of "El dinero blanquea" (money whitens
the skin) , and this eventually contributed to the
liberalization and relaxation of discriminatory practices
based solely on skin color. When the independence wars were
fought, all types of classes were intermingled for the fight
for freedom [Ref. 3].
21
C. TODAY'S SOCIETY
Before the oil and mining eras in Venezuela and Peru
began in the mid -1920s, about 70 percent of the population
was rural, illiterate, and poor. Over the next fifty years
the ratios were reversed, at least to the extent that more
than 75 per cent of the population became urban and
literate. No social group has escaped the impact.
Accelerating opportunities brought large number of
immigrants, increased size and power of the middle class,
feelings of cohesiveness , and the creation of a sector of
organized workers within the lower class.
The upper class was quick to see the advantage of a
growing economy and soon took over the fields of commerce
and industry, moving to consolidate its wealth through urban
pursuit. Upper class dominance in the economic sphere
somewhat inhibited the ingress of a middle sector. As a
consequence and in view of the tenuous hold the upper class
exercised over the political system, the middle class found
a greater access to mobility through political power and
soon solidified its hold on the government. It is
demonstrated by the fact that most of the presidents,
civilian and military have come from the middle class. The
polarity that developed between political and economic power
blocks and the orientation of each, came to reflect the
differences in the social origins [Ref. 4].
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D. RELIGIOUS CHARACTERISTICS
Actually some 90 percent of the people in Venezuela and
Peru are baptized in the Catholic Church. As a result of
missionary efforts 2 percent of the population is
protestant. A small number of indians continue to practice
their rituals and religions but some of them are still
adopting Catholicism.
Relations between the church and the state have been
harmonious throughout most of the current century and have
continued to be peaceful up to the present. Due respect is
accorded to the church through its representatives, who are
always guests at all important ceremonial functions. Clergy
are not barred from politics but they have gradually defined
their role in society in accordance with recognition of the
state's preeminence.
One of the most significant and important area of church
involvement in the Venezuelan and Peruvian societies is in
education. Catholic schools have traditionally educated the
children of the middle and upper class (because of high
tuition fees). Since the 1960s, attempts have been made by
the hierarchy of the church to establish some control over
the schools, to encourage the admission of a greater number
of scholarship students, and to increase the number of
schools with little or no tuition. The results in the 1980s
have been that more than two thirds of the Catholic Schools
23
and Colleges are tuition free in some regional areas or
competitively priced in the more populated regions.
Even though the image of the church's role has changed
in the public view, traditional attitudes and reactions
toward religion show little modification. Venezuelans and
Peruvians continue to practice a kind of Catholicism that
adheres only loosely to church doctrine but is deeply
emotional. Laxity in practice is widespread, as is a low
level of general knowledge of the basic tenets of the faith.
Of the various elements of religious practice, those
with a more solemn aspect are less popular than weddings,
baptisms, and the celebrations of saint's days (today it is
still a big event in the less populated areas), all of which
provide the opportunity for social contact in a festive
atmosphere. Frequently the religious significance becomes
secondary to social concerns. Moreover, affairs sponsored by
the most affluent become occasions for a considerable degree
of ostentation, as is usually indicated by the resultant
criticism from the church's hierarchy.
In all classes, religion is regarded as properly the
sphere of women. More conscientious in religious practice,
within the family they are expected to assume the duty of
religious and moral education of children. For girls early
training is followed by close supervision in accordance with
the socially protected status of the female sex. On the
24
other hand, boys because of a "Machismo" believe, are
somewhat sort of discouraged from religiosity. Moreover, as
experience and contacts outside the family circle increase,
this attitude becomes more firmly fixed.
In the university environment, where liberal and
communist inclinations are strongest, antireligious
influence is especially great. Many times marriage and other
social engagements might lead to a greater compliance with
outward form, but its basic view toward religious practice
remains unchanged. Although devotion is not openly
criticized, it obviously is not a positive element in the
Latin American ideal of masculinity [Ref. 5].
E. MAJOR TYPES OF LATIN-AMERICAN EXECUTIVES
1 . Constitutional President
Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the
Constitutional President is that it has existed in greater
numbers than is widely believed. One of the most
commonly-used terms with reference to Latin-American
politics is "dictator". To be sure, there have been many
dictators through the years, but there have also been a
great many presidents who have taken over official duties
and conducted these duties within reasonable bounds of
constitutional directives [Ref. 6].
A number of conditions are necessary for
satisfaction of this classification. Elections must be
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constitutionally acceptable, and a reasonable reflection of
the popular will taking into consideration the retardation
in such matters as suffrage and reality of public opinion
that exist in many republics. It must be understood that
this condition does not bar the eventual constitutionalizing
of a regime established initially by a coup d'etat.
Establishment of power may be necessary for the fulfillment
of constitutional conditions. At a suitable time thereafter,
however, legitimization of a proper sort must follow. It is
not easy to assess the propriety of this step in all cases.
When is a coup legitimized properly and when is it
legitimized under intimidation, for example ? There is no
sure formula widely applicable. One may perhaps safely judge
that the legitimation of the National Revolutionary Movement
in Bolivia in 1952, when Paz Estenssoro took over the
presidency, reflected a genuinelly-popular sentiment since
he had received a plurality of votes cast in the election at
issue. On the other hand, Batista legitimized himself in
1954 under strong intimidation of Cuban opposition groups
that left considerable doubt as to genuineness. A government
of doubtful status itself can pave the way for a
constitutional regime. For example, General Odria's
government established by force in Peru in 1948, and latter
supposedly legitimized by an election in 1950, made its way
under the shadow of a surpressed popular party (the
26
Apristas). By 1956, however, this party was allowed some
freedom and the election of Manuel Prado qualifies, in the
main, as a constitutionally proper one. The same phenomenon
occured in Venezuela where Colonel Marcos Perez Jimenez
stayed in power for almost ten years.
To satisfy the requirements of this type it is also
necessary that the opposition be given freedom to contest
elections reasonably and to express its views regarding
policy-making as well. Again, we encounter difficulty in
interpretation and must resort to a realistic appraisal of
local circumstances. Thus, in spite of the opposition's
continous cry of fraud and imposition, the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico must be granted
a place of legitimacy in this respects. The PRI must be
viewed for what it is - a very large confederation of
political groups within which the ordinary differences of
politics are fought out, similar to the Democratic Party in
some U.S. Southern States. There is considerable difference
between the PRI and the Colorados of Paraguay or the Partido
Dominicano of the Dominican Republic, to mention the other
major examples of one party domination in the Latin American
area. It is a difference that touches upon aspects of the
formation of opposition from effective party organization to
the various phases of the electoral process, and including
the effective pressure of opposition in the various media of
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communication. A very crucial criterion is of course the
application of laws affecting the freedom of expression in
its many forms [Ref. 7].
The fraternity of constitutional presidents does not
include those executives who have unreasonably maneuvered
constitutions to extend their tenure of office beyond the
spirit of the constitution. The practice of "continuismo" is
not in harmony with Latin American constitutionalism and it
is particularly at variance when it involves that version by
which a president-dominated constitutional assembly, after
drawing up a new fundamental law, proceeds to appoint the
incumbent to serve as president under the new system. This
disqualification does not extend, of course, to a proper
constitutional amendment relating to extension of tenure if
the incumbent then is elected to the office.
Finally, it should be observed that to occupy the
post of constitutional president, personalism must be
confined to constitutional limits. When a president,
however legitimate originally, climbs to a pedestal and
creates himself as an order above the constitution,
particularly if he actively sponsors a cult center on his
person, he has violated the spirit of Western
constitutionalism. The constitutional president must be




There is a strong correlation between republics
supplying the larger number of constitutional presidents and
the political awareness evident among the great mass of
people in those republics. The awareness is in turn
dependent upon well-known economic, and educational
advantage. The most constant in this regard have been
Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay. In the second rank
may be placed Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia.
Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, El Salvador, and Venezuela have
shown occasional promise; Bolivia appears to be enjoying an
introduction.
2 . Demagogic Caudillo
The Demagogic Caudillo has not yet appeared
frequently, but it is a highly spectacular type that
warrants attention because of the very modern touch
involved. It bears some similarities to European Fascism,
although it is not generally as extreme. There are a number
of distinguishing features that serve to give this type a
standing of its own. Argentina affords the best example
during the years that Juan Peron dominated the scene.
The first characteristic of the demagogic caudillo
is a very close relationship with constitutionalism. It
emerges in a system that has deep commitments to
constitutional presidencies in the past. The demagogic
caudillo can easily win legitimation by elections. He rises
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above constitutionalism not necessarily by violation of
electoral laws but chiefly on other grounds. The proper
habitat of this type is the republic with a high degree of
political awareness founded on an economic order of
considerable productivity. A key to the power structure is a
large industrial worker's movement of such massive power
that it becomes an aggressive reflection of popular support.
It must be constantly wooed and rewarded even to a point
beyond the attention customarily given to the military and
which, until the structure weakens, can be used effectively
to stand off strong military opposition. The maintenance of
such a system of mass approval calls for extraordinary
powers of organization, diversion and communication. One of
the weaknesses of the system is the difficulty of keeping
mass support alive, for the mass appetite grows and becomes
increasingly difficult to satisfy. Since the leader has
committed himself to the role of saviour of the worker and
since increasing adulation of him soon transcends the more
mundane spirit of the constitution, the cult of the Leader
results. It is this, characteristic that most closely
resembles the European totalitarian systems of recent memory
[Ref. 8].
Excessive nationalism, with the implication that
Latin-American leadership is involved, together with heavy
doses of anti-Yankeeism, is very important to the pattern.
30
One of the distinctive touches is ideological in nature. The
Leader becomes the symbol of the ideology-preferably a "new




The demagogic caudillo takes the old
complaints and declares that he has solved them by a
quasi-messianic summoning of the greatness of the people.
The demagogic caudillo represents a curious
combination of regressiveness and advancement. He is of both
worlds, old and new. He is regressive in that he builds
firmly upon ingrained authoritarism and creates a gigantic
monument to personal leadership; he is a symbol of
advancement in that he has realistically appraised a modern
industrial society, wooed and won mass support, and
undertaken a social mission in keeping with the twentieth
century's demands.
The prototype of this type of executive was, as
mentioned, Juan Peron. Vargas of the 1930' s merits some
consideration but his claim to real legitimation was rather
poorly-founded until his return in 1950. Peron was
popularly-elected in 1946 and again in 1952 and it is clear
that he would probably have been elected on both occasions
without the intimidations practiced by an enthusiastic party
following. He was raised to heroic stature and from this
eminence he clearly operated beyond the intention of the
constitution. It would not be correct to label Peron as a
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product solely of Latin American caesarism, or as the duce
of a totalitarian system, or even as a military dictator. He
was each of these in some measure but principally he
represents a new departure, a leader with the
characteristics of a constitutional president who, however,
soared out of the constitutional cage into a personal
venture so high as to allow for no safe return.
At the moment there is no demagogic caudillo in any
of the Latin American republics. If one were to explore
potentialities and engage the risk of speculation, there
appears only one real possible candidacy and there are many
reasons why it might not develop. This possibility is Fidel
Castro of Cuba. Cuba fits the pattern fairly-well in terms
of socio-economic pressures reflected in voluble mass
sentiments. It lacks the major ranking that could justify
pretensions to Latin American leadership, but this could be
outweighed by the image of Castro as a revolutionary leader
already possesed of heroic stature. Castro could ascend to
dizzy heights of personalism, particularly if there were
added some of the provocations that attended the rise of
Peron in Argentina.
3 . Military Guardian
The setting for the military guardian is the
republic of major or medium power in economic terms wherein
an appreciable - if not substantial - political awareness
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has been generated. Usually the political scene has been
sufficiently-active to provide for a number of political
parties. One of these parties may be the vehicle of
considerable popular sentiment for reform; its strength is
potentially great enough to make a bid for power and,
indeed, it may have done so only to be thwarted by perhaps
illegal methods. One of the sociological factors of this
setting is invariably the lack of a large middle class
actively seeking change. In such a sociological situation,
the military have usually been a political determinant. In
the period since the end of World War Two, excellent
examples have been found in Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela
[Ref. 9].
Against this general background, there may be viewed
the various thought patterns of the military officer intent
upon political power. Military guardians may arise in an
endless variety of combinations of local political
considerations, but there are two major justifications cited
by intervening military leaders that demand particular
attention: Order and Neutralism. Ordinarily, these are found
in combination and are closely related. Order is, of course,
a major preoccupation of the military profession everywhere.
In Latin-American republics, there occur many opportunities
for using this as a justification, although often the
intervention of the military goes well beyond the demand of
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the situation. More common in the ranks of military
guardianship is the complicated motivation that might be
said to result in a defensive military guardian. In this
maneuver, neutralism is cited in order to protect the
national dignity, honor, and traditions from the excesses of
the masses. Stated more bluntly, this is a last stand
against popular government that threatens the old order. A
large popular party presses forward with the electoral power
to sweep into office; the language of reform fills the air.
The military guardian comes forward to "save" the republic
from this mass "chaos". The best examples were in Peru and
Venezuela where the Apristas and Democratic Action,
respectively, had demonstrated enough power to win
elections. Accordingly, General Odria in Peru and General
Perez Jimenez in Venezuela intervened and suppressed the
parties at the gates. Both leaders stated that it was time
to save the masses from their own ignorance, or words
similar in meaning. General Odria, indeed, stated this most
colorfully when he announced that "party politics poisons
the hearts of the people and sickens their minds". One is
reminded of Thomas the Cynic in Ignazio Silone's "School of
Dictators" who stated that in socially-backward countries
"the army constitutes the only barrier against the so-called
anarchy of the popular masses and the corruption of the
politicians" refprd 10 This belief has been entertained by
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many Latin-American military guardians. The stated aim is
"neutralism" but the result is suppression of popular will.
All military guardians are, of course, driven by
some degree of personal yearning for power. The
military-officer class in a typical Latin-American republic
is a considerable reservoir for political ambitions. A
leader of this class may be given an opportunity sooner or
later to cite one of the ancient justifications for military
intervention and thus launch a political career at the head
of the republic. The military guardian, in our time, stands
ultimately at the mercy of the popular movement he wishes to
delay. Both Odria and Perez Jimenez have given way to
constitutional presidents, although the circumstances of
their withdrawal differ considerably; Odria presided over an
election and Perez Jimenez was ousted from office.
4 . Paternalistic Caudillo
In the paternalistic caudillo we find a type that
was most widely evident in the nineteenth century before the
onset of industrialism and associated effects. At the
present time, Paraguay, belongs in this category. Two
decades or more ago the paternalistic caudillo flourished in
most of the Central-American republics in spectacular
fashion. As the title of this type indicates, the system of
government resembles a large "hacienda" with strong
superimpossition of the "patron".
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The paternalistic caudillo is, indeed, a national
"patron". He may in fact posses large holdings in property
and control a number of basic industries. Nepotism is
especially evident in such a system; the total holding of
the caudillo f s family connection will be staggering. The
paternalistic caudillo carries to an extreme a
long-entertained notion in Latin-American political life:
the possesion of political power is a concession and the
concessionaire manages as large a return as possible (much
of which may be quite legal, or "honest graft" as it is
sometimes called in the United States). The republic is in
great part a private preserve. The caudillo need not be
overpoweringly oppressive, although he protects his system
with tightly-controlled military forces . He may be viewed by
many as a great national father who takes care of his own,
at least to the extent he feels is good for them. The
caudillo usually openly indicates that he is exercising a
tutelage over ignorant and child- like people who are not
ready for the bewildering machinery of a free system. Some of
the major examples have been Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua,
Rafael Trujillo in Republica Dominicana, Juan Vicente Gomez
in Venezuela and the actual president of Paraguay Alfredo
Stroessner [Ref. 11].
There are two electoral features that characterize
the administrations of paternalistic caudillos. The
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technique of continuismo is employed to excess in such
circumstances - that is, the application of domination to
extend one's tenure beyond the intention of the
constitution. The other feature has to do with alternation
in office. A paternalistic caudillo's position is usually so
secure that he can occasionally afford the luxury of
allowing someone else a turn in the presidential office,




III. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
A. INTRODUCTION
Is there a conflict between the people of a country and
its scientific community ? We doubt it very much. There may
be conflict between specific interests among individual
scientists, but surely this cannot affect the general
agreement on aspirations and objectives of the people which
is: to enjoy the fruits of science in terms of its
technological applications for human welfare. Accordingly,
it must be the responsibility of society, represented by the
state, and the scientific and technological communities to
work towards achieving this goal.
On the individual level, a scientist would be very happy
to have a well equiped laboratory, an up-to-date library,
assistants, and adequate funding. His happiness would be
greatly increased were he to publish his papers in a
well-reputed journal, preferably a foreign one, and discuss
his results in international conferences, thus acquiring a
respectable scientific record. A research centre would like
to boast of a large assortment of modern units, in one or
multudisciplinary areas, recognized as the largest in the
country or region. A central agency could satisfy its pride
by showing that a given country has so many thousands of
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scientist or so many hundreds of qualified researchers per
million inhabitants. All this is very fine. It is a
national and scientific obligation to acquire high levels of
scientific excellence, but this excellence provides only the
potential for benefit for the people until the science based
results are produced and applied. The excellence should
result in the welfare of the people of that society rather
than an unrealistic excellence facade that can only serve
foreign interests or those of individual scientists, thus
producing a number of serious consequences that could lead
to technological dependence [Ref. 12].
Similarly, in industry one may be content to acquire a
number of model plants. However the real measure of worth
should be measured by whether:
1. The technologies used were a product of local
indigenous capability and innovations.
2. The choice of the imported technology was made in full
or even moderate awareness of what was available on the
world market
.
3. The requirements of the majority of the population are
meet by this industry.
4. The possibilities of the national scientist system to
assimilate, adapt, manage and develop such technologies
were taken into consideration.
5. Whether the terms of such transference represent
definite advantages to the economy.
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B. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
In order to cope with such complex problems, a national
policy is needed in order to build up the Science and
Technology System and ensure that it is part and parcel of
the Development Plan of the country.
The main responsibility for this rests with the
scientist community and its awareness of its social
responsibility. In Latin American countries- as well as in
other developing countries- the political leaders, due to
different national and international considerations, and
irrespective of ideological beliefs, frequently and freely
express their hope to build their respective countries on
the basis of modern science and technology as a major
instrument for development, welfare and power.
Persistent trends to acquire a national science and
technology policy are being increasingly well received, and
practices for planning for science and its applications are
being partially implemented with varying degrees of success.
Contributions to the process of industrialization have been
from the public sector, and education, as well as the
experiences acquired in economic planning, resulting in
great possibilities for the systematic contribution of
science and technology in shaping the future of Latin
American Society [Ref. 13].
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C. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT
A development plan does not only concern itself with
economic growth. Development is not just economic growth;
it is growth plus change. In other words, the real
objective of development is not to increase production, but
rather to increase the capacity to produce. It depends on
people with the outlook, knowledge, training and equipment
to solve the problems posed by their own environment, and
thus controlling the environment rather than being
controlled by it. This capacity has grown in the now richer
industrialized countries by a historical process, sometimes
natural and slow, sometimes planned and even forced, often
aided from abroad, but also always indigenous.
Thus the basic role of science and technology in the
development process appears as a major instrument:
1. When it does not work in a vacuum but in response to
the pressures of the demanding market functions, in
providing new products or processes, or in providing
improved ones for better quality or less cost, i.e.
innovation production.
2. To increase the production and the capacity to change
the modes of production, with serious impact on society
locally and internationally.
3. To determine policies within the framework of a
national developmental policy, and never in isolation.
4. Which cannot be wholly or substantially imported, but
must be inherent in the structure of the society, its
environment and the national heritage.
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D. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
More than 60% of the people of the world live in less
developed countries, and have average annual earnings of
$150, contrasted to that in the industrial developed
countries of $ 2,000 per capita. The annual rate of growth
in gross domestic product (gnp= gdp - net income payments
abroad e.g. income of foreign investment) of the
industrialized countries is much higher than that of the
developing countries. The annual rate of growth of
population in the latter is around 2.8%, while that of the
former is almost stable. Accordingly people in developed
countries become increasingly richer, while those in the
less developed countries become poorer. In consequence, the
socio economic gap represented by standards and quality of
life in basic needs of food, shelter, education, consumption
of electricity, oil, minerals, industrial goods, etc. as well
as in all kind of cultural and physical activities, between
the developed and less developed world widens and steadily
increases. The consequences are dangerous.
Approximately 97% of the world's R&D resources, outside
the socialist countries, are spent by the developed
countries. Of this, 35% -55% is devoted to military and
prestige purposes, and less than 3% is allocated to urgent
agricultural environmental ana industrial problems of the
developing countries. This clearly indicate the importance
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given by the industrial advanced countries - which spend
between 2% - 4% of their G.N.P on R&D - to science and
technology, and how it is neglected by developing countries
whose vast problems remain unsolved [Ref. 14].
To bridge the socio-economic gap, there is no
alternative but to opt for science and technology using
combined efforts from the developing countries, and
assistance from the advanced countries. This means that
developing countries must mobilize and promote their limited
scientific and technological resources, properly orienting
their potentialities for effective use within the national
development process.
Targets can not be achieved without planning. No
effective planing can be implemented without the formulation
of a conscious science and technology policy refprd 14 This
policy must be armed with the following:
1. A realistic outlook on the role of science and
technology, separately and in combination.
2. A well-defined strategy regarding the socio-economic
demand of the science and technology system.
3. A practical and manageable institutional arrangement
for the formulation of such a policy and its
implementation.
4. A clear concept of international collaboration.
Such a policy must be able to answer such questions as:
how can we despite all obstacles and constraints, build up a
national system of Latin American scientific and
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technological capacity to use the wealth of available
knowledge to improve production and services:
1. How can we solve the crucial problems which confront
growth and progress?
2. How can we implant technology and alleviate
technological dependence?
3. And, finally, how can we cope with contemporary
advances in science and technology in the world system?
E. THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Although science and technology have become
interconnected, especially in the development process, a
distinction between the two ought to be borne in mind.
A little over one hundred years ago, the social
invention of the industrial research laboratory emerged.
Before that, and even after, scientific discoveries on the
one hand and inventions on the other had little to relate
one to the other. Both usually took a very long time to find
their way to industrial investment: photography took 112
years (1727-1839), the telephone 56 years (1820-1876), and
the radio 35 years (1867-1902). But with closer relations
between science and technology, between the
scientific- technological system and capital investment, and
between defense and economic policies. Diffusion periods
were shortened: radar took 15 years (1925-1940), television
12 years (1922-1934), the atomic bomb 6 years (1939-1945),
the transistor 5 years (1948-1953), and the integrated
circuit 3 years (1958-1961) [Ref. &aas]
.
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Science can supply the basic knowledge required for
understanding the origins and dynamic of the problems, for'
measuring their magnitudes and directions, and for devising
and assessing possible approaches to cope with them.
Technology draws on scientific knowledge and can provide
many of the practical tools and techniques for tackling the
problems and applying the results. The union of them was
finally accomplished by industrial research. This was also
made possible by the action of and interaction with other
important socio-economic instruments such as capital, laws
of the market, education and training, and managerial
capabilities
.
Under such prevalent conditions, the outcome of the
marriage between science and technology is innovation. It is
today the most recent and valuable industrial force and
commodity in world trade. Electronics and petrochemicals are
a good example [Ref. 15].
It may seem unrealistic for poor, developing countries
to undertake innovative research because of the formidable
costs and risks. Yet, this is exactly what Japan has done
and surprisingly it made it's greatest break-throughs in
science-based industries. Japan was a poor country at the
turn of the present century, with very limited natural
resources; but it had great will and determination, a policy
and a plan. Apart from the financial requisites, the
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capability of the national science and technology systems to
orient themselves toward realistic goals is essential.
It is clearly necessary to establish a sound
infrastructure for national scientific and technological
activities. In developing countries, which are usually poor
in terms of qualified manpower, the scientific community
encounters serious difficulties in convincing governments to
allocate appropriate funds. The slogan that science and
technology must be recognized as a sure investment for sure
returns always need to be proven materially. In Peru and
Venezuela, one frequently hears of the readiness of the
president and ministers of planning and finance to provide
funds equivalent to the annual loss of income resulting from
specific problems in agricultural production, in health or
in industry. It is our belief that relevance to
socio-economic development should be the primary strategy
and attitude of the science and technology system. Even in
small laboratories or R&D units, concerted, alert and
directed efforts to tackle a few problems through adaptive
or development research would achieve great results. Such a
strategy would reinforce the Science and Technology System
and bring it to the forefront of national interest. We also
believe that the science and technology system should
embrace all scientific and technological activities.
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F. PROBLEMS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
1. Alienation of Outlook
One of the major constraints and obstacles which
confront the national Science and Technology Systems in a
developing country, and indeed in many countries of
Latin-America, is the alienation of outlook which generally
dominates the attitudes of the scientific community at
large
.
Very frequently, and by virtue of necessity,
developing countries send their young abroad for study and
training. In an overwhelming number of cases their research,
even in fundamental science, does not pertain to problems
endemic to their countries. Upon their return home, they
continue along the same line of research, thus serving
indirectly the interests of the developed countries rather
than their own. The problem is much more aggravated through
the natural cycle of their work particularly when they train
younger scientists, inculcating them with the same attitude,
consequently building up several centres of research lines
alien to and at the expense of their own poor country. This
represents a striking feature of an internal brain drain,
for it reduces the limited potentialities for planning
research programs relevant to development. It also
represents an obstacle to policies of science geared to
national interests [Ref. 16].
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It may be true that such scientists do not intend to
harm their own societies; most of them are nationalistic,
and believe that by carrying on such important research they
will bring prestige to themselves and their countries. Their
research is related to international trends, and is
published in leading professional journals. They attend
international conferences and become recognized in
international society. Some even dream of winning awards
such as the Nobel prize. Thus, in the final analysis they in
fact belong to scientific communities which may be alien in
every respect to their own country.
In many cases foreign aid accentuates such
contradictory tendencies. This is an additional reason for
regulation and planning international cooperation schemes in
developing countries.
A science and technology policy should consider
these problems. One possible solution is to send scholars
abroad expressly to study specific problems pertaining to
national interest. These scholars should, of course, be well
equiped with a deep understanding of national problems in
order to become the linkers in the process of technology
transfer.
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2. Domination of Classical or Academic Traditions
In the majority of developing countries, the role of
the universities is deeply influenced by Renaissance
concepts, i.e. that they should be centers of excellence
rather than institutions endowed with social responsibility.
Universities in Latin American countries seem to be mere
prototypes of typical North American universities, this
despite the fact that these have undergone several changes
in their own concept and systems.
It could be rightly argued that the primary research
function of a university is to be primarily concerned with
fundamental sciences. However, what is really questioned
here is the choice of subjects for research. Developmental
and applied research necessitate basic research. In
developing countries, the concentration should be on applied
research in the majority of cases, instead of trying to cope
with the new trends in modern science. This aspect could
also be a part of the phenomenon of alienation.
Another disastrous result in Latin American
countries especially in Peru and Venezuela has been the
conversion of technical institutes to classical university
prototypes, instead of their extension or conversion into
technological universities.
Another problem has been the increase of university
education and its spread over different provinces of
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countries like Peru and Venezuela. This is of a great
importance and has positive values, but more emphasis on the
new trend of technological education (high and medium)
should have been strengthened and given more social
recognition. Down play of the general myth of the
university degree as an ultimate goal in itself instead of
an instrument of progress would have helped the process of
technological change.
The bureaucratic application of the laws and
regulations of the University system such as admission
standards and the measures for the promotion of teaching
staff is even more ironic.
The social implications are deep and disastrous. One
example is the deepening of a general fashion of academic
degrees that have become a tool for social recognition. Thus
great writers as Andres E. Blanco in Venezuela and Mario
Vargas Llosa in Peru are generally referred to as "doctors"
as if the title were more creditable than their genuine
creativity
.
The authors believe that the investment in education
is a matter of priority for a country in its struggle for
economic development. The investment in human resources
through education is indispensable. The return on education
investment
, whether for short technical types of programs or
long ones involving graduate education, should at least
equal the opportunity cost lost by not making the same
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investment in public works, agricultural development or
welfare.
G. TRANSFER AND DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY
Industrialization has become the cornerstone of economic
growth and development plans in developing countries
.
Naturally these countries see the transfer of modern and
sophisticated technology from the vast pools available in
advanced countries. A study made by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1972
estimated that, "the direct annual foreign exchange payments
by the developing countries for imported technology are very
high and have serious implications on their trade and
balance of payments". It also adds that "the technology
transfer to developing countries are themselves
innappropiate both as to the factor use and product type.
The large scale transfer of technology from abroad may
inhibit the development of technology capability and thus
make technology dependence on the developed countries
virtually perpetual". A number of extensive studies were
made by international agencies (especially UNCTAD), regional
organizations as the Andean Pact countries (Pacto
Subregional Andino) and other institutions and individuals.
Many recommendations were worked out for an international
code of conduct on transfer of technology, and the creation
of new institutional arrangements for the transfer and
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development of technology [Ref. 17]. The Declaration on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order adopted
at its sixth special session by the General Assembly of the
United Nations included:
Giving to the developing countries access to the
achievements of modern science and technology, and
promoting the transfer of technology and the creation of
indigenous technology for the benefit of the developing
countries in forms and in accordance with procedures
which are suited to their economics.
The Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economical Order adopted at the same UN
session included a special section (IV) on the question of
transfer of technology. Due to its crucial importance, the
problem was also included among the main agenda items in the
United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for
Development that took place in August 1979.
Because the subject of the transfer and development of
technology from the United States to developing Latin
American countries, and especially Peru and Venezuela is the
subject of this thesis, it is important to stress the
following four needs:
1. The Need for a National Policy for Technology .
Most developing countries have acquired a deep
understanding for the need for development policies for
production and services. In addition, there is a growing
awareness of the importance of a national policy for
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science. Science and technology are very closely linked, and
it is evident that technology is nationalistic by its very
nature. Inventions or innovations are usually products of
local requirements and conditions, and then registered and
protected according to national and international laws, and
finally put on the domestic and world markets as
commodities. It is thus inevitable that developing countries
recognize the need for a national technology policy that
integrates both science policy and the national development
plan [Ref . 18]
.
2. The Need to Create a National Centre for Technology
Transfer and Development .
Among the institutional arrangements universally
recommended as a key instrument for formulating and
achieving the objectives of a national technology policy, is
the establishment of a national centre for technology
transfer and development. UNCTAD, in its third session in
Santiago on 16 May 1972, adopted a resolution (39 III) on
the transfer of technology that called on developing
countries to establish such institutions [Ref. 19].
3
.
The Need to Lift Limitations Imposed by Transfer of
Technology Arrangements on National Scientific and
Technological Capabilities
Very often, limitations exist in a wide variety of
forms, each varying in intensity and impact. They greatly
limit the diffusion of the dynamic impact of technology on
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the national economy through their effect on the recipient's
ability to choose or adapt technology according to local
needs and resource endowments. They also restrict the
development of the domestic infraestructure for research and
development for both the local and international markets,
and inhibit access to inventions or improvements to existing
technologies on reasonable terms [Ref. 20].
4. The Need to Emphasize and Ascertain the Very Close
Links Between Science and Technology .
The real link is an effective applied research and
development institute, whether in industry, agriculture or
medicine, with design and engineering at its core, together
with extension services.
Without fulfilling these needs, a country could claim to
have industrial plants, but not industry, by the same token,
it could claim to have scientific institutes, but not
science.
Two major issues arise in implanting science and
technology. First, to implant science and technology in
developing countries, the Systems must have the full
participation from the outset of their national scientists,
engineers, economists and sociologists in the process of
importing technology. Participation should start and
continue at all stages of project preparation. R&D
activities could preferably be placed within the site, or in
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an applied research institute. This procedure ensures that
the Science and Technology System could adapt to the
requisites of the imported technology; it could learn,
digest and assimilate it and then adapt it to local
conditions and objectives [Ref. 21].
Second, the Science and Technology System in a
developing country would have to reverse current research
emphasis, and concentrate on adaptive research and
development, followed by applied and needs oriented basic
research. To do so, the Science and Technology System must
live with the problems when and where they arise: in





A. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER DEFINED
Technology Transfer is difficult to define as its
meaning depends on the time at which the transfer was made,
the people considering the transfer process and the intended
usage. For the purpose of this thesis, Technology Transfer
means
:
The process whereby technical information originating in
one institutional setting (country) is adapted for use
in another institutional setting (country) [Ref. 22].
The key words are "adapted" and "technical information".
A very broad concept of technical information is chosen. The
term is used in the sense that Donald Schon [Ref. 23].
defined technology as:
Any tool or technique, any product or process, any
physical equipment or method of doing or making by which
human capacity is extended.
Technology Transfer is more than just disseminating
technological information; it is a conscious effort to
disseminate information in quantity, quality, and format for
use by the recipient.
Samuel I. Doctors stated that technology transfer should
be viewed as a political, social, and economic problem.
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Although numerous papers have been written about technology
transfer and some field studies have been conducted, it is
difficult to obtain meaningful information on the process of
transfer [Ref . 24]
.
Technology Transfer may be either vertical or horizontal
in nature. Most agencies and organizations are more
effectively organized for vertical transfer, which is, the
application of a technical principle to produce a new
product or process within the organization or discipline.
Horizontal transfer is the application of a principle to
products or processes in another discipline or institutional
setting.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Simply put, technology transfer is the application of
technology to a new use or user. It is the process by which
technology developed for one purpose is employed either in a
different application or by a new user. The activity
involves principally the increased utilization of the
existing science- technology base in new areas of application
as opposed to its expansion by means of further R&D. It
provides the means by which elements of the existing
science- technology based can be more closely coupled to the
innovation process in order to spur productivity growth. The
time span for the transfer can be quite short-a matter of
days in case where the technology transfer may be directly
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applied in its existing form to the new environment- or the
process can extend to a considerable number of years in
cases where extensive modifications of the technology,
redesign or adaptive engineering is required to make the
technology fit its new role, or because an appropriate user
has not yet found it.
A variety of means is available to Transfer Technology,
depending on the nature of the technology and the specific
circumstance prevailing in each case. Methods range from
licensing agreements, joint ventures, and turnkey factories
to technical consulting, product sale, trade exhibits, and
personal contacts. No single method is appropriate for all
situations. The effectiveness of the different approaches in
terms of the ability of the technology recipient to learn
and to acquire increased technological know-how varies.
Generally, those methods that involve considerable person to
person contact and some measure of education and training
are considered to be more effective approaches. Successful
Technology Transfer therefore hinges, to a large extent, on
whether effective communication is developed between the
principal parties. Effective communication, however, is
necessary but not a sufficient condition to assure success
in Technology Transfer. Many other technical, economic, and
social factors also have a bearing on the eventual outcome.
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Technology Transfer is not new, it has been in existence
for a long time. In the thirteenth century Marco Polo helped
introduce to the Western world Chinese inventions such as
the compass, papermaking, and the use of coal for fuel. It
has been only in recent years, however, that a concerted and
systemized effort has been made to transfer technology as a
means to stretch the R&D investment, and to develop greater
utilization of the existing science- technology base in order
to generate greater economic impetus. Technology Transfer
offers the opportunity to obtain a greater return from past
investment in R&D, but is not an end in itself. Its
importance lies in its ability to stimulate and strengthen
the innovation process. As such it provides the means by
which the rate of technology innovation might be increased.
To understand the importance of technology transfer in the
innovation process, it is necessary to look more closely at
how technology transfer interrelates with innovation.
Much attention is being devoted to the subject of how to
better manage the country's considerable technological
resources. Technology Transfer and Technological Innovation
represent two different aspects of the overall subject.
Despite the fact that each topic has individually enjoyed
wide attention in recent years, there nevertheless is a
definite interrelationship between the two which is often
overlooked or neglected in treatment of the subject. The
59
purpose here is to examine the interrelationship in order to
achieve a better understanding of how these two concepts
mutually affect one another. Viewed in their proper
perspective, a better appreciation can then be gained of
their importance on the national scale.
Because of the numerous "definitions" and
interpretations of the meaning of "Technological Innovation"
and "Technology Transfer", the authors think that the two
concepts must be individually discussed briefly to help
clarify their meaning. It should be realized, however that
innovation and technology transfer are themselves subject to
much research at present, giving rise to the currently
imprecise definitions.
1 . Innovation
Innovation refers to the series of activities which
in effect delivers an invention or idea to its first
acceptance and use. The innovation process is subject to the
influence of many internal factors such as economic and
political climate, competition, public opinion, market
conditions, company management policy, and the availability
of financial resources. As a result, the innovation process
generally is evolutionary in nature, and typically expands
many years. Innovation is by no means confined to the
technological sphere but exists also in the arts and in
educational, social, and political circles.
60
The principal interest here is Technological
Innovation, the process of taking a concept, invention, or
idea and developing a useful product, process or technique
which gain initial acceptance in the market place or user
community. Some authors regard technological innovation to
occur in three major sequential phases. Others, consider
the innovation process simply to be bounded in time by two
specific events, the time of first conception and
realization. The intervening time period between the two
events constitute the innovative period. A summary of the
innovation process goes roughly as follows.
Phase 1 is initiated at the time of first conception
of an idea, recognition of a need, or discovery of an
invention. First conception is then followed by a period of
evaluating available knowledge and alternative methods to
seek an economically and technically feasible means to
realize the idea, satisfy the need, or apply the invention
or concept as the case may be. Phase 1 then can involve
additional research and development in its early stages
where new techniques or processes may be investigated and
hypotheses tested. Positive results at this stage then
provide impetus for Phase 2 where more detailed technical
and cost analysis, further technical development, and
problem solving are conducted to establish the technical and
economic feasibility of the concept. Establishment of
61
feasibility then leads to Phase 3 which involves engineering
development, design, manufacturing, market analysis,
marketing, and finally introduction into the market or to
the user, at which point first realization is achieved, and
the innovation process is considered complete. The wide
diffusion of an innovation throughout the market it serves,
further technological improvement, and its further
adaptation to new applications occur after first
realization. This time period is referred to as the
postinnovative period [Ref. 25]. It might also be
considered as the institutionalizing period.
It is important to note that innovation is initiated
not just through the generation of an idea or invention, but
can be stimulated from recognition of a need or technical
opportunity. In fact, recent results from different
researchers indicate that most successful innovations arise
from need recognition rather than idea generation or
intervention. That is, demand-pull rather than technology
push was found to be the stimulus in most case of successful
innovation. This does not imply that inventions and idea
generation are not important in the overall innovation
process. On the contrary, although need recognition is found
to be the major stimulus for first conception in most
successful innovations, many of these may not have succeeded
without the benefit of inventions and ideas developed during
the innovative period.
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Because innovation is subject to many internal
influences which are not controlable by the innovator,
serendipity and luck play a significant role in determining
success or failure. Consequently, the innovation process
develops an evolutionary nature which is not amenable to
strict management and control. This is evident by the
relative disparity in time span between first conception and
first realization of successful innovation. Battelle found
that their limit sample of successful innovation
nevertheless covered widely varying time period between six
and thirty-two years for the ten innovations studied. The
average time span for this ten cases was nineteen-years
.
Moreover, it was found that the innovative time period
varies for different industries, technologies, product type,
and means of financing [Ref. 26]. Thus, environmental
factors determine to a large degree the chances for a
success or failure of a particular innovation. Alternately,
the chance for successful innovation are greatly enhanced if
environmental conditions conducive to innovation are
established.
2 . Technology Transfer
In any discussion of technology transfer, one
invariably must contend with the question of what is meant
by technology. Technology has been defined simply to be the
application of science. However, this definition is
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inadequate. For instance, the dropping of a pin may be
construed as application of the law of gravity to remove the
pin from the hand to the wastebasket. However, this is not
an example of technology. The imprecise nature of technology
therefore rules against a precise definition. Perhaps a
helpful approach is to distinguish technology from science.
Whereas science is concerned with the increase of knowledge
and understanding, technology is directed toward use.
Whereas the result of scientific research is usually
publication of a paper, the output of technological activity
is a product, process, technique, or material developed for
some specific use. Technology not only involves the
application of science but also can incorporate inventions
and additional research to some extent. Patents are more
commonly the outgrowth of technology rather than of science.
The phrase technology transfer also suffers from
ambiguity, partly because of the imprecise nature of
technology, and partly because the word transfer naturally
leads to the question from where and to whom? It implies the
existence of a source of technology and a recipient or user.
The technology source and the user are not necessarily
within the same technical discipline, so that technology
transfer often points to an interdisciplinary activity
requiring the attention of people knowledgeable in several
fields. The activity involves principally the increased
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utilization of a proven technology base rather than its
expansion through further research and development.
For our purposes we may consider technology transfer
to be the application of technology to a new use or user. It
may be a direct application or may include the need for
adapting or tailoring the technology to its new use or user.
An example of direct application to a new user is the
introduction of the Israelian irrigation system to
Venezuelan agriculture. An another example where technology
was adapted to the new user is the introduction of the
Peruvian potato into Europe. In this case an experimental
effort was necessary to adapt the potato to local soil
conditions, weather, diseases, pestilence, as well as
consumer needs and preferences. The use of low frequency
electromagnetic transmissions in airborne instruments for
geophysical exploration is an example of a new application
of a technology originally developed as a world wide
navigation aid for ships and aircrafts. Hence, it is
technology transfer since it represents a new use of
existing technology.
Technology transfer should also be distinguished
from research utilization or technology utilization, which
refers to the transition of research results or knowledge
into goods or services to satisfy some requirements or needs
of the user [Ref. 27]. Technology transfer then may be
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viewed as the process by which research utilization is
directed to a new use or user. Alternatively, technology
transfer can be regarded as secondary utilization of
existing technology.
3 . Why Technology Transfer
Technology Transfer then is really not something
that has only recently emerged, but has existed in various
forms for many years. It is only in recent years of austere
research and development funding; however, that increased
interest has developed in technology transfer as a means to
enhance the effectiveness of research and development and to
increase our utilization of the existing technology base for
the technological change and progress needed to sustain our
countries (Peru and Venezuela) economic growth. From a
different perspective, technology transfer offers the
opportunity to obtain a great return on past investment in
research and development. As a consequence, the precepts on
which technology transfer is based are unimpeachable.
The great promise of technology transfer lies in its
systematization and organization on a national scale.
However, the realization of the promise remain elusive,
principally because of the innumerable technological,
political, economic, social, and behavioral factors that
affect the outcome. As concluded by Burns, "The mechanism
for technology transfer is one of agents, not agencies"
[Ref. 28].
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Effective communication and interpersonal
relationships are the most important factors contributing to
successful technology transfer. But social sciences have not
yet devised a way by which this principle can be practiced
in a systematic or organized fashion. Furthermore, the
human ego is notoriously resistant to management acts of
control
.
C. THE TECHNOECONOMIC INTERFACE
The interface between the science- technology base and
economic progress is a complex one buffered by strong
social, economic, and political currents. Not everyone is
able to work effectively at the technoeconomic interface
level. Thomas A. Edison, famous for his inventive ability,
for example, in pioneering the electric light system, is
often considered the personification of an innate ability to
move easely within and between the realms of science,
technology and economics [Ref. 29]. Nevertheless, he still
needed to rely on a number of close associates to help him
pick his way through complex technological, political, and
financial hurdles. To place the principal element of the
technoeconomic interface in proper perspective, consider the
following model:
1» The science and technology base provides the principal
foundation for achieving productivity growth and
economic progress. However, the science and technology
base, if it is to contribute in any significant way,
must be effectively coupled to demands of the economic
sector.
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2« Technological innovation is the key link between
economic progress and the science- technology base.
Innovative products and services introduced into
commerce help stimulate high productive efficiencies
that give rise to gradual economic progress.
3. A strong economy in turn generates growing capital
resources, a portion of which is plowed back for
reinvestment in more innovative ventures and further
productivity gains. However, the link between
technological innovation and the science-technology
base, can not be taken for granted irrespective of the
resources devoted to R&D.
4. Full exploitation of the science-technology base
depends on ready access to and the effective use of the
scientific knowledge and technical know-how already in
existence.
There must be a conscious effort to utilize these
resources through transfer and adaptation for improving the
rate of technological innovation. Technological advances
derived from the innovation process also contribute to an
expanding science- technologic base, which in turn provides a
strong foundation for further economic gain.
Of the four principal elements of economic growth
explained in the previous model, perhaps the least
recognized and appreciated is technology transfer. A major
reason is the feeling that we have successfully gotten by in
the past without concerted efforts to transfer technology.
This outlook is tantamount to expecting that future
conditions will mirror those of the past. However, world
conditions continue to change. New patterns of international
technology flow will develop. Rapid dispersion of technical
and management skills will take place, bringing on increased
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competition and shortened product life cycle. Demand for
technological products and services will continue to expand
in the face of strong competition for the R&D. The
information explosion will be exacerbated. All these factors
will make the conscious transfer and effective use of
available technology even more compelling and too important
to leave to chance if strong rate of economic growth are to
be restores and sustained.
Technology transfer acts to strengthen the linkage
between the innovation process and the science- technology
base. However, the flow of technology should not be
construed to be only one way, that is from the
science- technology base. There is an equally important
feedback link where technological progress resulting from
the innovation process also acts to broaden the
science- technology base in conjunction with the R&D input.
In general, the balance, bilateral flow of technology is an
important aspect of technology transfer if substantive
benefit are to be realized by the principal parties
involved. Although the one way flow of technology may
produce transitory benefits, long-term advantages from
technology transfer, whether at the industrial, national or
international level, are sustained by means of a mutually
beneficial exchange in which both the resource and recipient
prosper.
69
1. The Interchange of Technical Knowledge
Because of differences among nations in
technological capabilities, there a continual process of
international diffusion of technology. Knowledge can be
transmitted in various ways - by emigration of engineers and
skilled workers, by export of goods and services, by
licensing, and by direct investment, among others. Data are
available concerning national receipts and payments for
patents, manufacturing licenses and technological know-how
between parent firms and their subsidiaries as well as
between independent firms. Taken at face value, these data
seem to indicate that billions of dollars in payments are
involved, that the United States seems to be one of the most
important supplier of technology to Latin American
countries. Therefore it seems clear that technology
transfer in the modern world economy is a very big business.
Moreover, technology transfer is an activity with
very important economic impacts and implications. It has a
major impact on the pattern of world trade and the
balance-of -payments problems of individual countries, and it
has a very important influence on the rate of economic
growth in various countries and specifically in Peru and
Venezuela. It is the purpose of the authors to describe
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briefly what economist think they know about this impacts of
technology transfer. In addition, certain aspects of the
transfer process will be discussed, including the role of
the multinational firm.
It is important to point out that, according to
available studies, technology is currently being transfer
across national boundaries is increasing. During the
nineteenth century, 20 to 30 years often elapsed before a
product developed in one country was produced in another
country. For example, it was about twenty years after their
introduction in the United States that the rotary printing
press and typewriter were first introduced in Britain. At
present, however, the imitation lag is much shorter-in many
industries such as electronics, only a few years, on the
average. For example, John Tilton's studies of the
international diffusion of semiconductors during the 1950'
s
and 1960's shows that the average lag between the time a
major semiconductor device was first produced and the time
when it was first produced outside the innovating country
was about two years. Or consider the stainless steel razor
blade introduced by Wilkinson, a British firm; within a
year, American firms had competing products on the market.
This reduction in the imitation lag is important, because it
means that an innovating country will export an innovation
for a shorter period of time than in the past. In a
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relatively shor period of time, its new products may be
produced abroad and perhaps even exported back to the
innovative country.
2. Role of Multinational Firms
Another relatively new facet of the transfer process
is the important role of multinational firms which have been
responsible in part for the acceleration in the rate of
international diffusion of innovation. Multinational firms
transfer technology to foreign countries in a variety of
ways. In those countries where they have plants, they train
people as operatives and managers. Also, they sometimes
stimulate suppliers to upgrade their technology. For
example, pharmaceutical companies have helped local firms in
less developed countries with the fabrication of dosage
forms. In addition, multinational firms sometimes set
standards for their competitors. For example, American
electronics firms seemed to have applied considerable
competitive pressure on European firms in the 1960's. Also,
they sometimes establish overseas R&D facilities, which aid
in the transfer of technology. Often they train users and
provide service for customers. For example, in the computer
area, IBM has transferred a considerable amount of important
technology by training potential users, providing software a
nd servicing computer installations in various countries.
Also, whether or not a firm has a plant in a particular
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country, the availability of its product in that country may
be a form of technology transfer.
Many case studies of particular industries attest to
the important role played by the multinational firms in the
international diffusion of technology. For example, Tilton's
study of the diffusion of semiconductors shows that of the
major innovations in semiconductors in the 1960's, American
subsidiaries were the first to produce about 1/3 of them in
Britain and about 1/5 of them in France. In particular,
subsidiaries of American firms were relatively quick to use
silicon and planar techniques, and by competing strongly
with established European firms, they were able to capture
large shares of the market. In 1968, foreign subsidiaries
had 44% of the market for semiconductors in Britain, 33% in
France, and 22% in Germany.
Many case studies also describe the role played by
the multinational firm in the transfer of technology to the
less developed countries. It is important to recognize,
however, that these firms face much more difficult problems
in transmitting technology to the less developed countries
than to industrialized countries. Many of the techniques of
the multinational firms may not be suited to the less
developed countries, with their plentiful unskilled labor,
few skills, and little capital. Moreover, there is sometimes
little incentive for multinational firms to adapt their
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products, production techniques, and marketing methods to
the conditions present in these countries. Unfortunately,
less developed countries lack the technical capability to
effect the necessary adaptations themselves. The
technological gap is so wide that multinational firms find
it exceedingly difficult to transfer many technologies to
less developed countries; and when they manage to do so, the
effect is often are restricted to narrow segments of the
local economy.
3. Technology , Productivity and Economic Progress
The role of technology in the economic sphere is no
less important, though perhaps less clear-cut, because of
the many nontechnological determinants of economic progress.
The widely used measure of economic progress is
productivity, which is defined as output per unit of input.
Productivity growth occurs when higher productive
efficiencies are achieved. For the economy as a whole,
higher productivity means better control of inflation, less
unemployment, and a better quality of life in general. For
the individual company, higher productivity means lower unit
costs of products and increased market competitiveness.
Similar to technological change, productivity change is the
more meaningful descriptor of a nation's economic progress.
The rate of productivity change is commonly used as an
economic measure and is generally given in terms of annual
percentage change.
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It is clear that technological change is but one of
many factors affecting productivity. Nevertheless,
technological change is widely viewed as the single most
important contributor to productivity gains because it
generally leads to more effective use of labor, capital, and
natural resources- the other principal elements of production
[Ref. 30]. Because the results of technological change are
not easily measured, estimates of their contributions to
productivity growth vary in the 40-70 percent range
[Ref. 31]. That is, roughly half of the productivity gains
can be traced to technological advances that are reflected
in improved manufacturing methods, materials, and machinery.
By contrast about 15 percent of productivity gain results
from capital formation, and approximately 12 percent comes
from improved education and training of the labor force. Of
the many input elements to productivity, then, technological
advance appear to be the most effective avenue for fueling
productivity growth. However, technological change is by no
means synonymous with productivity improvement.
We can conclude therefore that technological change
provides the most promising avenue for higher productivity
gains. The continuing inflationary spiral coupled with the
increased scarcity of nonrenewable resources will cause the
price of raw materials to continue its upward trend at a
fast pace, thereby limiting the potential for raw material
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to contribute significantly to productivity increase. The
present trend toward more government regulations for
protecting the environment and the safety and health of the
workers on the job will add to the social cost associated
with the free-market economy and consequently will tend to
lower future productivity gains.
Though technological progress may become even more
important for achieving high productivity in the future, it
must still be recognized that it does not automatically
result in improved productivity. Only to the extent that
technological advance is coupled to the process by which new
and improved goods and services are introduced into the
commercial market does technology contribute to
productivity. The process by which technological advance is
translated into competitive goods and services-technological
innovation-is therefore a prime determinant of the
effectiveness by which technological progress is translated
into high productivity output in the national economy.
4 . Technology Transfer in Less Developed Countries
Technology Transfer plays a fundamental role in the
economic growth of the less developed countries. Clearly,
one thing that they badly need is more efficient technology.
Unfortunately, however, modern technology often requires
considerable capital; and the less developed countries, with
their low investment capability, find it difficult to scrape
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up the required capital. Also, and this is frequently most
important, the less developed countries find it difficult- to
copy and use modern technology because they lack an educated
and skilled labor force, and have few good engineers,
technicians, and managers.
More fundamentally, it is important to recognize
that much of the advanced technology is really not very well
suited to the circumstances prevailing in the less developed
countries. Because the industrialized countries have
relatively great amounts of capital and relatively little
labor, they tend to develop and adopt technology that favors
capital over labor. This technology may not be appropriate
for less developed countries where there is little capital
and lots of labor. Thus, it is very important that the less
developed countries pick and chose among the technologies
that are available in the industrialized countries, and that
they adapt the technology to their own conditions. Mindless
attempts to ape the technologies used in the industrialized
countries can often result in waste and failure.
In industry, most of the new technology adopted by
the less developed countries is taken from the developed
countries. There is probably too little effort being made to
devise new technologies more appropriate to conditions in
the less developed countries, both because the less
developed countries do not have the engineering and
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scientist resource to attempt such work, and because such
attempts have not been very successful in the past. In
countries where the private sector finds it unprofitable to
carry out research and development, government research
institutes sometimes attempt to fill the void, but these
institutes frequently devote too much of their limited
resources to projects that are not closely related to
economic development. In addition, productivity centers have
been created in some countries to teach managers and
supervisory personnel how to make better use of technology:
such centers have helped to promote the diffusion of new
technology in Peru (Servicio Nacional Tecnico Industrial)
and Venezuela (Instituto Nacional de Capacitacion
Educativa)
.
D. BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The authors think it is very important and helpful to
think of Technology Transfer in the context of the user
rather than the context of the supplier of the technology.
The user's circumstances certainly determine the barriers to
transfer as much as does the supplier's situation. From that
point of view it is possible to identify four classes of
Technology Transfer. First, technology transfer where the
investment barrier in the receiver country is the major
problem in introducing new technology. In other words, the
capital resources needed to create the capability, really
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determine the critical problems which must be overcome in
transfering the technology. The second is the local
application barrier for the use of the product in the local
market where adapting it to the local market is the critical
problem. Third is the adaptation barrier where the problem
is in manufacture, where it is necessary to rescale or
modify the manufacturing process, either to meet local
market needs or the local scale of production. And, finally,
there is the technical capability barrier typically
associated with satellite manufacture. Here local technical
capability is frequently at a rudimentary level, and the
initial problem is to determine what level of technology can
be pursued on a cost effective basis in manufacture of
products or components to be imported to the original
supplier of the technology.
1 . Investment Barrier
Here, typically, the situation is one in which the
technology is itself highly developed and very
sophisticated. The cost associated with further advances in
the technology is very great. And, typically, the cost
associated with manufacturing the product involves high
tooling expense and highly specialized equipment.
Consequently, the small size of the user country, makes the
returns on the necessary investment unattractive. At the
same time, the supplier finds itself under continuing
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pressure to increase the local manufacturing level of the
product
.
The critical problems in achieving Technology-
Transfer when the investment barrier is the major problem,
are normally in manufacturing and quality control, not in
product design or even in modifications to fit local
circumstance. The most difficult task is to identify
deficiencies in the specifications, because specifications
are never complete. The primary response to this problem is
a very intensive interchange of people
,
in which the
country receiving the technology sends its experts to the
manufacturing facilities of the supplier of the technology,
so they can observe, work carefully with their counterparts,
and learn how the product is manufactured. As necessary, the
supplier also sends people to the receiver of the technology
to help trouble shoot.
2 . Application Barrier
This barrier is typically associated with the sale
of materials and components where, in many cases, export
sales are difficult, if not impossible, because the supplier
can't transfer applications directly from its market to the
user market. Three kinds of constraints impede export sales.
One is that the scale of operations is quite different, so
that a use which make economic sense in the supplier's
country doesn't necessarily make sense in the user's
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country. The second is that the vendor infraestructure
,
which supports an industry, is different in different
countries with respect to availability of components, price,
quality, assurance of delivery, etc. So, again, a trade-off
between make and buy, will result in a different choice and
in turn will affect technology transfer. And finally, in
some cases the customer requires different features,
quality, or performance. For all these reasons the economic
advantage of the technology being transferred must be
demonstrated in the specific context of the local economy of
the country that is the potential user.
3
. Technology Adaptation
The third barrier, technology adaptation, is
frequently involved in transfer of technology to the
suppliers of foreign manufacturing affiliates- those that
will be serving the local market or some regional market,
the Andean Market for example. The typical problem in this
transfer is to optimize the suppliers designs and
specifications for most efficient operation. It is necessary
therefore to have technical talent at the users level in
order to make the necessary modifications. These people must
be thoroughly familiar with the manufacturing capabilities
of their plant. They must be able to redesign the product
both to optimize a specific manufacturing setup and
integration with the local market. They must modify
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specifications, materials and processes to what is
economically most attractive in their particular
circumstance. The most difficult part of this task is to
understand which aspects of a specification are critical to
performance. Because specifications are always in response
to a mixture of economic trade-off, they have to distinguish
one from the other in order to modify designs and
specifications successfully.
4. Local Capability
The final barrier, local technical capability, is
tipically associated with off-shore satellite manufacture.
This mode of operation is chosen when the supplier is
seeking very low cost, particularly by taking advantage of
very low labor rates. Opportunities for this mode of
operation are usually associated with less-developed
countries. This arrangement is often initiated by choosing
some part of a process, usually an assembly operation, in
which investment is very low. The supplier of technology may
start with a simple assembly operation, and with progress
along the learning curve, increase the complexity and size
of the assembly operation as cost benefits are discovered.
In all likelihood they will move from assembly into
fabrication as the local capabilities grow both within the
plant and the supporting industrial infraestructure . Thus,
the supplier helps the user to grow by introducing
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additional funds and additional technology into the region.
At the same time, as the local aspirations grow and change
the supplier also learns more about what is available
locally and how to take advantage of it.
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V. THE TECHNOLOGY FACTOR IN LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
It is the intent of the authors to analyze in this
chapter the actual situation and policies within most of the
Latin American countries, where new developments, and new
attitudes toward multinational corporations have emerged.
These policies focus on rapid industrialization based
upon a new and revised access to foreign technology and
rapid growth of internationally competitive domestic
industries. Technological self-sufficiency has become a
primary goal in the development plans, and the strategy
toward that end encompasses the progressive transfer of
engineering and management capabilities, rather than
technology embodied in plant and equipment.
Latin American development authorities are now keenly
aware that the key to long-term growth and development lies
in acquiring the ability to design and engineer industrial
systems, which in turn necessitates the development of
indigenous capabilities in product design, process
engineering and equipment design and construction.
There are several reasons for this new orientation in
development strategies. One is that Latin-American economies
have reached a stage of development where industrial
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enterprises need to achieve substantial increases in
productivity and competitiveness in order to sustain
continued growth.
Industrial plants in Latin America, producing largely
for tariff -protected, domestic markets, have been heavily
dependent upon foreign licensing sources for technology,
resulting in product designs and production systems that
rarely are competitive in world markets. In the seller's
market generally prevailing in protected economies, product
design and production techniques are often stagnant and lag
behind in terms of improvement and modernization.
The aforementioned tendency is intensified by the
privileged position of subsidiaries of foreign firms and
large national enterprises, both of which have easy access
to packaged industrial technology, including trademarks,
patents, processing techniques and equipment, and a full
range of technical services and managerial systems. In
addition, foreign owned firms are often able to' bypass
technology payment restrictions that smaller, local firms
are unable to avoid, thereby placing the latter at a
competitive disadvantage.
State-owned enterprises in Latin America also have much
less difficulty in technology acquisition, since they have
access to the financial resources and managerial talent
needed to choose and negotiate for technology. In contrast,
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smaller Latin American firms encounter difficulty even in
searching for appropriate technology and in arranging for
suitable adjustments in product design or manufacturing
processes and equipment.
Latin America has been especially critical of
foreign-owned and controled subsidiaries that bring with
them industrial technology which obviates the need for
developing indigenous design and engineering capabilities or
supporting capital goods industries. Once established in an
economy, foreign-based multinationals also preempt or
stultify the development of indigenous industry because of
their comparative advantage in management and technology.
This is a lesson that most Latin American governments have
learned from the Japanese experience, where, beginning in
the early 1950s, the Japanese Government screened all
foreign investments and leasing agreements to minimize the
adverse side-effects of preemptive foreign presence or
restrictive licensing arrangements [Ref. 32"].
Technological upgrading is needed especially at the
domestic enterprise level to meet increased competition at
home and abroad. Technological upgrading involves new
processing techniques, the use of new and improved
materials, and the introduction of new and improved
production methods. In some cases, this may involve more
dynamic and aggressive licensing arrangements which break
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the dependent linkages with single licensing partners and
move on to more diversified sources of equipment, materials,
product designs, process licenses, and hired technicians. A
principal inhibiting factor has been the lack of financial
resources and mechanisms to fund the purchase of technology
from foreign sources and/or to obtain indigenous design and
engineering support services. Improved access to technology
sources and design-engineering resources can contribute
significantly to increased productivity, and extended
utilization of domestically available energy and mineral
resources, and an enhanced competitiveness in world markets.
B. NATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
Increasingly Latin American nations have resorted to
interventionist efforts to restructure the demand for, and
supply of, technology in their respective national economies
and in the world economy at large. Programs and initiatives





Each of these communities impacts upon the transnational
transfer and domestic utilization of technology. The nature
and efficacy of involvements understandably vary from
country to country depending upon the involved mechanisms
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and programs, and the skills and capabilities of involved
people and institutions.
It is the purpose of the authors to analize the relative
function and role of each of these communities in Peru and
Venezuela as follows:
It Restructuring supply of technology (screening and
control)
.
2. Restructuring internal demand for technology (planning,
searching, and negotiating).
3. Reinforcing the absorptive infrastructure (training,
supporting,, using and generating).
Until recently, most national mobilization efforts in
Peru and Venezuela fell within the first category. Initial
strategies to restructure the supply of technology were
aimed at an international level and focused on obtaining
international consensus on a Code of Conduct which would be
binding on the actions of multinational corporations. This
strategy also sought major revision in the international
property system which, in the Latin American view, placed
them at a disadvantage in acquiring foreign technology.
Failure to obtain cooperative support in this strategy,
particularly from the industrially advanced countries have
led the developing nations, and in this case Peru and
Venezuela, to incorporate legal and regulatory changes into
their respective national laws regarding foreign investment
and technology transfer [Ref. 33]. The two countries
studied in this thesis (Peru and Venezuela) have instituted
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programs to restructure the supply of industrial technology
to domestic enterprises.
It is important to point out that for the purpose of
this thesis, terms can be defined as follows:
1. Screening : Includes the monitoring, evaluation and
assessment of foreign technologies.
2. Controlling : Includes restrictions on the inflow of
foreign technology based on appropriateness to national
development goals.
3. Planning : Includes policy coordination and project
formulation.
4. Searching : Includes both creation of an information
system and individual search and evaluation activities.
5. Negotiating : Includes activities of the parties
negotiating and the new government monitoring role.
6. Training : Includes all activities related to know-how
transmission through people.
7. Supporting : Includes services such as standard
setting, patent registration and extension services.
8. Using : The ultimate goal at which any technology
transfer system is aimed, includes research (basic and
applied) and design and engineering of products and
production systems.
C. MYTHS AND REALITIES CONCERNING TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
Certain misconceptions concerning the nature of
industrial technology and how it is derived must be
dispelled if we are to deal realistically with the problems
of technological development in Peru and Venezuela.
To begin with, science and technology cannot be packaged
like any other commodity and dispersed by the industrially
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advanced countries along with their other foreign aid.
Science and technology do not come in convenient,
self-contained units that can be packaged and shipped for
use from one part of the world to another.
Technology as has been stated before, is derived from a
continuum of of activities encompassing research,
development and engineering, which in turn is often
intimately linked to ongoing production and marketing
activities. Most industrial change which includes the design
and engineering of products themselves, the materials that
go into them, the equipment that is used in processing
materials, the work methods and management control systems
is a continuing process consisting of a myriad of elements
which results generally in small incremental changes
[Ref. 34].
The diverse "products" of science and technology
activities are often derived from unique social
environments. Technology "products" are further linked to
user environments that provide the signals for what is
needed in the way of new or adapted products or processes.
Another basic misconception is that dependence on
foreign technology may be substantially reduced or
eliminated through the development of indigenous science and
technology in universities and research laboratories. In
reality, the extent to which technological selfreliance can
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be achieved depends in large part upon the stage of
industrial (and technological) development in a particular
country. In the post-World War period, Japan depended
heavily upon operational technology from foreign sources,
gradually replacing foreign engineering and design with
indigenous scientific and technological capabilities to
supplement foreign imports. "Unbundling" (and redesigning
and repackaging) was a basic technique used by the Japanese
in their industrial evolution [Ref. 35].
A third misconception is that government- to- government
aid programs can provide development of indigenous science
and technology in universities and research laboratories
which in turn can be channeled into the productive sectors.
The fact is that rarely have the programs addressed
themselves to the designing and engineering of "operational"
technologies. One basic problem is that the lion's share of
efforts go toward a long-term buildup of basic research
ability, most of which is unrelated to the applied and
development research that feeds into operational
technologies
.
A fourth myth is that industrial technology can be
developed in university laboratories and industrial research
institutes to help replace industrial systems traditionally
supplied by foreign enterprise sources. The fact is that
science and technology communities do not produce
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operational technology packages. Furthermore, even if they
did, the linkages between these communities and the
productive sectors are largely ineffective. Science and
technology communities can perform an important ancillary
role in support of industrial design and engineering efforts
to improve, enhance, or supplement foreign enterprise
sources of operational technology, but they cannot be the
major supply source now or in the foreseeable future.
Operational technologies will continue to be the
products of enterprise units linked to technology generating
units. The university community in the particular case of
Peru and Venezuela can best help by developing human
resources to take a more positive role in creative design
and engineering activities.
D. MANAGING TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN PERU AND VENEZUELA
As Peruvian and Venezuelan governments have sought to
intervene in the development process, they have inevitably
infringed upon enterprise decisions governing production and
marketing activities. In the technology field, administered
guidelines and regulations have sought to lead (or compel)
enterprises into new channels of supply (from indigenous
sources to replace foreign suppliers) or to screen
technology imports to eliminate restrictive clauses in
foreign licenses to assure that the price paid is not
excessive and to influence decisions in the choice of
92
technology "appropriate" to the national endowment and
development goals. The inevitable difficulties (and
dilemmas) lie in the basic conflict between commercial
interests to maximize profits in price-distorted economies
and the achievement of national developmental goals, which,
if adhered to, would often reduce realizable profits and,
more importantly, would seriously complicate the life of
enterprise managers.
The fact is that "dependence" upon foreign technology is
a form of risk aversion for domestic private enterprise, and
the foreign patents and/or trade marks provide positive
reinforcement to the effective exploitation of protected
domestic markets.
In response to the foregoing dilemma, Peruvian and
Venezuelan governments have increasingly turned to
administered controls to intervene in technology markets.
This has subsequently given rise to another set of problems.
One is that technology markets are highly complex in nature
and the sheer quantum of what must be monitored poses
monumental tasks for government bureaucracies. Moreover,
efforts to screen and control acquired technology, or to
impose various restrictions on what should be bought and the
amounts that are paid merely serve to reduce the supply of
technology without offering commercially viable alternatives
for technological development from within the economy.
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Another dilemma concerns short-term gains versus
long-term growth. National efforts to develop indigenous
technological capabilities to make decisions without
persistent dependence upon foreign aid, to negotiate more
effectively for technology components, to adapt acquired
technology as needed, to produce technology where
appropriate, and to improve bargaining positions vis-a-vis
foreign investors and other technology suppliers may result
in production losses, at least in the short run. In the long
run, however, a more dynamic and self-reliant technology
structure that reaches into production systems can
contribute significantly to productivity (more efficient and
extensive utilization of available resources) as well as to
the general level of employment and national output.
Difficulties and frustration in national policy formulation
are inevitable if government authorities fail to recognize
the trade-offs in this area, but insist instead on having
their cake and eating it too.
E. UNITED STATES RESPONSE
In response to this new set of national development
objectives involving the technology component, both in Peru
and Venezuela, a number of U.S. -based companies have been
entering into technology transfer agreements that are
significantly more responsive than in the past to the
emerging demands for new modes and content in technology
acquisitions by the above mentioned countries.
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The new generation of agreements reflects, in part, some
of the profound changes that have occurred in the world
economy, as well as changing perceptions of certain U.S.
corporations as to how they may use their technology assets
and know-how in new and more imaginative ways, and at the
same time continue to earn a return on their corporate
assets .
These innovations in corporate involvements center
around the technology component of industrial systems, but
they also involve profound adjustments in international
marketing and production strategies of involved companies.
From the corporate perspective, the attractions of
equity investment in, and managerial control of, foreign
facilities are waning. A growing number of multinational
corporations have now decided that the risks associated with
overseas capital investments have become too high for
realized rates of return. Aside from political uncertainties
in a widening area of the world and especially in Latin
America, there are the economic vicissitudes brought on by
world inflation, exchange rate evaluations, and recessionary
cycles, all of which have added to the risks of locking into
fixed investments in a world of changing circumstances.
These uncertainties have been compounded by the
fragmentation of world markets resulting from import
substitution behind tariff barriers and regional trading
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blocs as a partial offset to the inefficiencies of protected
national economies. The growth of host country restrictions,
regulations, and limitations on foreign investment has also
tended to detract from this traditional mode of overseas
involvement
.
Another feature of the new technology- sharing agreements
is the buy-back arrangement whereby the supplier agrees to
accept partial payment in product. Once regarded as a
necessary evil for market entry or retention of market
share, these arrangements are coming to be viewed by foreign
corporations (U.S. and Europeans) as a hedge against import
restrictions and exchange controls remitted earnings.
In some cases, companies find offshore manufacture of
components and parts less costly than in their original
factories and, in those cases, have a double incentive to
enter into buy-back arrangements.
Another factor which has contributed to the
accommodating response by U.S. corporations has been the
progressive advance in bargaining power that some Latin
American countries, and among them Peru and Venezuela, are
now able to exert in negotiations with multinationals. This
enhanced bargaining leverage is derived from a variety of
new conditions, any one of which in and of itself, is not
necessarily determining; but, combined, result in a marked
shift in the balance of bargaining power between technology
96
suppliers and purchasers in favor of the latter. The shift
in bargaining leverage is attributable in part to the
proliferation of alternative sources of industrial
technology from Japan, Western Europe and even Eastern
Europe
.
The supportive interventionist role played by almost all
Latin American governments in the technology transfer
process also has enhanced the bargaining positions of Latin
American enterprises. Peruvian and Venezuelan governments
have adopted a variety of other supportive roles,' ranging
from acting as prime negotiator and purchasing agent in
technology transactions to the erection of government
agencies to screen and control incoming technology and
capital investments.
Both Peru and Venezuela have begun to use their mineral
and oil resources as leverage in acquiring industrial
facilities and know-how to process their resources for world
markets
.
Another factor which has contributed to the shift in
bargaining leverage has been the perceptible upgrading in
recent years of the knowledge and skills which technology
purchasers in less developed countries like Peru and
Venezuela, bring to bear in negotiation sessions with
multinational corporations.
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F. NEW GENERATION OF TECHNOLOGY- SHARING AGREEMENTS
The new generation of technology-sharing agreements is
significantly more responsive than traditional licensing and
investment modes to the emerging demands by countries like
Peru and Venezuela for new types of and content in
technology acquisitions. Under these new arrangements the
international competitiveness and self -generating
capabilities of personnel in the adaptive engineering
process is an invaluable contribution to the self-reliance
that Peruvian and Venezuelan governments have been so
anxiously seeking.
Binding arrangements to export a percentage of
production output assures that these domestic enterprises
are meeting internationally competitive quality and
performance standards, and (to the extent that export prices
reflect costs) international cost competitiveness. An
overview of the principal changes that have occurred in the
marketing, production, and engineering fields in Peru and
Venezuela follows:
1. Changes in the Marketing Function
With a view toward improving the productivity of
resource utilization and balance-of -payments positions, many
development authorities have called for moving national
enterprises from the shelter of protected markets,
characteristic of the import substitution phase of
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industrialization, into more competitive environments of
regional and world export markets.
This has placed considerable demands upon technology
suppliers to assist enterprises in less developed countries
in the logistics of international marketing and
distribution. One significant innovation which U.S.
corporations are making in this area is to permit purchaser
enterprises in developing world countries to channel their
products to world markets through their own highly developed
and efficient international marketing systems. From the
developing-nation viewpoint, this provides reassurance about
the economic efficiency of installed plants and equipment.
A second significant change taking place in the
marketing function of the new technology-sharing agreements
has been the granting of trademark rights by U.S.
corporations to the purchaser enterprise. The benefits
derived by the newly industrializing nations are both
practical and psychological. By committing its trademark and
logo, a U.S. firm is, in effect, guaranteeing that the final
product will be as good in every respect as any product
coming off its own production lines. This means that the
technology purchaser can anticipate the transfer and
constant updating of those production methods and product
design modifications which comprise the U.S. firm's latest
technology. This situation requires that the U.S. company
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spend an extraordinary amount of time training workers of
the purchasing enterprise in production techniques so that
the product can be interchangeable with that which is
manufactured at the firm's other plants.
An important distinction needs to be drawn here
between the above-described situation and the practice among
multinational corporations of fully exploiting
internationally recognized trade names and logos in less
developed country markets. In the latter case, the product
is typically manufactured in an owned and controlled
operation of the multinational, located either in the home
country or in a less developed country. Such products
frequently constitute overwhelming competition for locally
designed and manufactured products, carrying unfamiliar
trademarks. It is this situation which has prompted
development authorities in Peru and Venezuela to require
that goods produced under international licenses and
carrying foreign trademarks also be marked with a local
trade name and logo. In this way, it is hoped the public
will come to associate those products as much with a
national company and national capabilities as with a foreign
multinational
.
A final innovational dimension in the marketing
function encountered in some of the new agreements is the
buy-back arrangement. Under buy-back arrangements, the
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technology supplier agrees to accept partial payment for the
technology in product, rather than monetary compensation,
which is then distributed to the supplier enterprise's
worldwide customers or subsidiaries. The overriding value to
a less developed country enterprise of such arrangements is
the guaranteed level of exports. Such exports make the
technology transfer process a self -financing proposition.
Above and beyond being assured the means of paying for the
technology transplant, the purchaser enterprise is
guaranteed a hard currency buyer of its product.
2
.
Changes in the Production Function
The new technology- sharing agreements obviously
represent a radical departure from the traditional approach
that United States corporations have taken toward managing
technological assets in Latin American countries. In the
past, it was only late in a product's life cycle once the
production techniques had become generally available that
the corporation was prepared to release technology. Today,
however, and because of the new attitude of Latin American
governments and the competition from Japanese and European
corporations, a growing segment of U.S. industry is prepared
to sell available technology. Its release is often under
terms that assure rapid and efficient implantation of an
internationally competitive production capability.
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Acquiring internationally competitive technology and
production systems (high-volume, cost-efficient, and
quality-controlled products) is particularly compelling to
newly industrializing nations like Peru and Venezuela, in
that it permits the saving or earning of sorely-needed
foreign exchange (through either import substitution and/or
export promotion) with which to further expand and upgrade
industrial production. Earning of hard currency is also
critical in light of the debt burden now carried by Peru and
Venezuela.
In addition to providing a scope and level of
technology which permits quick entry into world markets,
another innovation in the production function evident in the
new agreements is the training component. Often such
arrangements are accompanied by intensive educational and
technical programs designed to create a self-sufficient
manpower base within the country capable of managing and
operating the newly acquired plants or production processes.
A final and extremely significant change taking
place in the production area has been the ancillary function
performed by some U.S. supplier corporations in the
progressive development of domestic capital goods industries
and related supplier plants as contributions to overall
industrial growth and development. The development of
forward and backward linkages has been an integral part of
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Changes in the R&D Function
The contribution to indigenous design and
engineering capabilities is another important innovational
dimension that must be considered as a result of the new
agreements. These capabilities are viewed as essential
skills needed to adapt foreign product designs and
production techniques to indigenous factors of production
and, more importantly, to generate their own technology.
Training in design-engineering is often imparted through
contracts calling for joint execution of plant engineering.
Joint research efforts oriented to the development
of new product designs or processes for eventual entry into
world markets also represent a departure from the way R&D is
traditionally carried out.
Another change which is also extremely supportive of
the development objectives of the country's industrializing
nations is the structuring of enterprise relations so as to
wean the less developed country's enterprises from foreign
technology sources. Engendering technological self-reliance
is a principal objective in the new contract relations being
formulated in Peru and Venezuela.
103
G. NEED FOR NEW INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
Currently, the issue of technology transfer between U.S.
and Latin American enterprises and specifically in Peru and
Venezuela is beset by critical problems associated with a
growing demand for new technologies and the inadequate
U.S. -firm supply response. The authors believe that this
situation will not be alleviated at least in the near
future.
The underlying reasons for the inadequacy of U.S.
response are:
1. The traditional sources of the bulk of U.S. industrial
technology have been the larger-size firms (with sales
above $ 100 million a year) who are reluctant to share
technology on other than an equity investment or
related licensing arrangements.
2. The medium to smaller size firms (with sales below $100
million a year) are not able to obtain financing for
the outright sale of manufacturing know-how and related
design-engineering services that are typically
associated with industrial technology transfers.
It is for this reason that the authors intention in the
final chapter of this thesis is to make:
1. An analysis of Peruvian and Venezuelan needs for new
institutional mechanisms.
2- Specific recommendations for new institutional
mechanisms to bridge these gaps.
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VI. GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFER OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY TO PERU AND
VENEZUELA
A. INTRODUCTION
The developmental objectives of Peru and Venezuela place
strong emphasis upon continued economic growth and more
equitable income distribution. A basic strategy to realize
these objectives is through enhanced efficiency and
competition to be achieved through technological upgrading
of their industries. Another basic strategy is to intensify
the exploitation of their mineral and energy resources. More
equitable income distribution is to be achieved through
purposeful efforts to further decentralize industrialization
from the existing urban centers and to mount specific
programs to increase income and employment among the rural
and urban poor.
In order to accomplish the above developmental
objectives it is essential to have an adequate Technology
Transfer from the more developed countries. Peru and
Venezuela traditionally have been influenced by the United
States (cultural, economical and technological). Therefore,
in this chapter the authors propose guidelines, initiatives,
and mechanisms to facilitate the transfer of U.S. Technology
to Latin America, and specifically to Venezuela and Peru.
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B. THE ECONOMY AND TECHNOLOGY
1. Technology Factor in National Development
Peru and Venezuela have reached a stage of social
and economic development where substantial increases in
productivity are needed in order to sustain economic growth.
At the same time, unemployment problems and uneven income
distribution necessitate substantial human and capital
resource reallocation. Rural and urban poverty continue to
be pressing problems. Government planners are fully
cognizant of the need for a dual development strategy which
increases productivity while increasing income.
The plan to balance income consists in part of
decentralizing small and medium- sized industries into rural
areas, thereby creating employment opportunities and raising
income levels. Special emphasis has been directed to
development of the agribusiness sector. Through tax,
interest and exchange rate policies and related monetary
measures government authorities hope to redirect previous*
policies, such as excessive import substitution, which have
allocated resources inefficiently. Other assistance programs
include efforts to upgrade output in agricultural regions
and plans to encourage the proliferation of labor-intensive
industries
.
Efforts to increase productivity are linked to the
structural transformation of Peru and Venezuela into urban,
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industrial economies competitive in world markets. The
financing of economic growth depends to a large degree upon
exchange earnings from energy and mineral resources as well
as the continued expansion of export and manufactured goods.
One focal point of restructuring is the agribusiness sector
with a view toward redesigning products and commodity
processing to improve quality standards and efficiency for
export markets.
Growth of export industries involves in part the
extensive upgrading of technological capabilities through
use of various financial and technical support measures.
Long-term programs include plans for the development of new
mineral and energy resources for export to strengthen Peru
and Venezuela foreign exchange positions.
State-owned enterprises are spearheading development
of Peru's copper, gold, silver, phosphates, iron, gas and
petrochemicals industries as well as Venezuela's aluminum,
iron, gold, gas and petrochemical industries, but both
governments are also relying heavily upon the private sector
to support expansion in these sectors. The latter will
require economic incentives including favorable financial
arrangements, to ensure an adequate flow of credit to the
private sector, as well as augmenting the influx of private
external capital. The development of technological
absorptive capabilities and supply structures for the design
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and engineering of production systems is part of the
log-term growth objectives of the above mentioned countries
planning authorities.
2 . Sector Priorities
Mineral and energy resources development is
considered to be a leading prospect for development. The
dual aim is to effectively explore for and exploit oil,
iron, copper and gas resources and to retain managerial
control in national hands. This also applies to future
mineral development. State enterprises have been negotiating
"associated agreements" with U.S. and other foreign firms to
provide exploration, mining and processing technologies. The
main points of contention in the past over foreign
involvement have been:
a. National participation in resource management.
b. The sharing of technical data developed in connection
with exploration operations.
c. The training of nationals in the full range of
technical-managerial tasks.
d. Pricing and profit-sharing formulae.
Peru and Venezuela do not have the exchange reserve
position to replace foreign investment in the mineral and
energy resource area. This has heretofore limited their




Another priority development area is the export of
manufactured goods, involving mostly medium-to-smaller-sized
firms. The main obstacle is to upgrade product technical
quality to permit entry to the more competitive world
markets. These quality levels are not now required for the
protected domestic markets in which most national firms have
evolved. Present regulations governing technology imports in
Peru and Venezuela are part of the Andean Pact. The latter
sets limits on what can be imported and on levels of
payment, and it compounds the technological development
problems faced by industrial enterprises.
Foreign-owned firms bring technology with them and
are able to bypass the payment restrictions that inhibit
national firms, and thus placing the latter at a
competitively disadvantageous position. The large
native-owned and managed enterprises are in much stronger
financial and technical position to develop or adapt product
designs and adjust production methods to local needs and
conditions than are smaller-size firms with limited
financial and managerial resources and capabilities.
Smaller-sized native owned firms have difficulties both in
diagnosing their technical problem and in effectively
carrying out appropriate action.
A third priority area is raising employment and
income levels among the rural and poor populations. The
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Peruvian and Venezuelan governments are particularly anxious
to develop programs that raise productivity of low- income
groups, and to assure maximum return of these gains to the
poor. One possible approach is through the development of
enterprises and income- earning projects that integrate the
two dimensions of productivity gains and income shares.
Such programs require adapting to the need and emerging
capabilities of involved populations, appropriate training
and technical assistance programs and supporting
institutional networks.
3. Policies for Scientific and Technological
Development
National science and technology policies and
programs in support of economic growth and development have
been influenced, in part, by the Andean Code. Its broad
objectives are to reduce technological dependence on foreign
sources through restrictions on foreign private investment,
the national control of foreign licensing agreements, and
development of indigenous technological acquisition and
adaptation capabilities in support of national enterprises.
The latter includes the support and development of national
laboratory facilities and indigenous capital goods
industries. Through the Andean Code, proposals have been
made to create a central technology purchase agency
supported by a regional science and technology information
center. Other programs include the sponsorship of regional
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development projects such as the processing of copper, the
use of tropical forest resources and various projects of the
petrochemical industry.
Intervention in an enterprise decision is regarded
as a necessary step toward national technological
development. It is generally believed that the only way to
deal with the adverse effect of uncontrolled foreign
technology acquisition is through the systematic control of
technology transfer as recommended under the Andean Pact
Code. Among the criticisms levelled against industrial
technology acquired from foreign sources is that it:
a. Does little to resolve the problem of urban
unemployment
.
b. Tends to be capital-wasting as measured by the capital
cost per job generated.
c. Contributes to further concentration of economic power
in terms of the size of enterprise units and of income
distribution efforts.
d. Fails to minimize use of imported materials.
C. GUIDELINES TO PERUVIAN/VENEZUELAN POLICIES AND
INITIATIVES
1 . Measures to Consider
The various measures that Peruvian and Venezuelan
governments may wish to consider may be broken down into
functional groups:
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a. To plan the technology component of product systems.
b- To conduct our own research, design and engineering
functions
.
c. To search and negotiate for technology from foreign
sources
.
d. To carry out technical supporting services and
training.
e. To utilize acquired technology in terms of
installation, operation, and maintenance of systems.
The previous chapter of this thesis has described
the need to have a variety of institutional means to:
a. Restructure the supply of technology (largely through
the screening and control of technology acquisition
from foreign sources).
b. Restructure the internal demand for technology (through
reinforcement of planning, searching and negotiating
capabilities at the public institution and enterprise
level)
.
c. Reinforce the absorptive infrastructure through
training of key personnel in the use and generation of
technology and related support systems.
The particular combination of measures Peru and
Venezuela may chose to undertake will depend upon a broad
variety of factors, including: the degree to which market
mechanisms encourage- and promote private sector initiative;
and the effectiveness of existing institutional mechanisms
involved in financial, research, and other support
capabilities at the enterprise level, which constitute the
critical link in technological development.
Both Peru and Venezuela have begun to move away from
strong emphasis on screening and control of the supply of
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technology from foreign sources toward more effective ways
to reinforce the demand for technology.
This is in reference to the ability to search for
and select technology among alternative sources and to
negotiate on favorable terms for technology, and to
reinforce technological absorptive capabilities at the
national enterprise level.
National technological development objectives are
increasingly focusing on the restructuring of effective
demand for the technology component of productive systems to
create or reinforce supporting infrastructure, such as
design and engineering firms, technical research institutes
and laboratories, and capital goods industries that can
design and manufacture machines and equipment more suitable
to these countries emerging needs and conditions.
Technological capabilities to reinforce the
absorptive infrastructure vary widely and are far more
difficult to manage than the creation of screening and
control mechanisms. Development authorities in Peru and
Venezuela now perceive that the major obstacles to
technological self-sufficiency lie not so much in knowing
what they do not want and keeping it out , but in knowing
what they do want and need, and how to acquire it on
favorable terms and use it effectively. National legislation
and budgeted expenditures have not proven to be the most
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effective means for achieving desired results. The
principal infrastructural deficiencies in Peru and Venezuela
relate either to shortages in trained technical personnel
and/or to inadequate linkages between research communities
and productive enterprises. Both countries are relatively
well endowed in technical and entrepenurial capabilities at
the enterprise level but inmense unemployment problems pose
a unique set of pressures on the economy to upgrade
technological absorptive capabilities so as to accelerate
growth, create jobs, and generate income.
The major means for implementing technology programs
have been:
a. The use of state enterprises in basic industries.
b. Government funding of science and technology programs.
c< Financial mechanisms in support of technology
obj ectives
.
d» Government controls over international transfer of
technology
In the case of Peru and Venezuela, the institutional means
to manage technological development are as follows:
a) Restructuring the Supply of Technology (Screening and
Control): Decisions 24 and 85 of Cartagena Agreement
(ANCOM) regulations.
b) Restructuring the Internal Demand for Technology
(Planning, Searching, and Negotiating): Evolving
capability in energy and mineral resource management.
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c) Reinforcing Absorptive Infrastructure for Technology
(Training, Supporting, Using, and Generating):
1. Generating agreement designs to upgrade absorptive
capability.
2. Encouraging evolution of capabilities among
small- to-medium enterprises.
2. Negotiating for Technology Acquisitions
The ability of Peruvian and Venezuelan enterprises
to negotiate advantageous technology-sharing agreements in
identified opportunity areas will depend upon:
a. The bargaining leverage and enterprise strategies of
the technology supplier.
b. The bargaining leverage and enterprise strategies of
the technology purchaser.
c The supporting programs and policies of the purchaser
government
.
d. The distinctive characteristics of the transferred
technology
For the process of negotiation for technology
acquisition the authors have summarized the factors covered
in Chapter IV, and in this Chapter, in the following model
as an analytical framework for technology sharing by U.S.
based multinationals with Peru and Venezuela:
a) Technology Supplier
1. Bargaining Leverage






- Returns from technology sales provide funds to
maintain technology lead.
- Continued access to lucrative market.
- Possibility of future low cost procurement
source
.
- Continued access to scarce resources.
b) Technology Package
1. Distinctive Characteristics
- Size and complexity.
- License to manufacture or turn-key-plus.
- Operative, duplicative, or innovative
characteristics.
- General, firm, or system-specific stage in
product/process cycle.
2. Supporting Government Policies
- Screening and control mechanisms.
- Technical support networks.
- Acting as the negotiation and purchasing agent.
- Infant industry protection.
c) Technology Purchaser
1. Bargaining Leverage
- Reinforcing government support.
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- National resource endowment.
- Financial and foreign exchange.
- Attractive national market.
- Technological absorptive capabilities.
- Alternative sources of technology.
2. Enterprise Strategies
- Obtain internationally competitive technology.
- Entry into export markets.
- Fast, efficient technology transplants.
- Duplicative and/or innovative design and
engineering capabilities.
- Training of technical-managerial manpower.
Possible commercial, technical and financial
strategies motivating the supplier enterprise to share
technology, along with the various elements which contribute
to its bargaining position, are listed in the "Technology
Supplier" aspect of the model. Similarly, purchaser
strategies and sources of bargaining leverage are listed in
the "Technology Purchaser" aspect of the model.
The ultimate viability and success of any technology
transfer and implantation depends heavily upon the level of
support extended by the government to the purchaser
enterprise. There has been an increasing determination on
the part of the Peruvian and Venezuelan governments to
intervene in the negotiation process to assure favorable
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contractual terms for national enterprise and to provide
further reinforcement in the implantation stage. Included
here are:
a, The protection of infant or national industry against
foreign imports.
b. Provision of technical support networks and
institutions to assist the purchasing enterprise in the
production and marketing function.
c Making available necessary credit and foreign exchange
needed to purchase equipment and expert training
programs
.
The potential value of a technology package to a
purchaser and the adjustment problems it poses are a
function of the distinctive characteristics of the
technology supplier. The authors have listed some of these
major characteristics of technology in the "Technology
Package" section of the model.
Elements of the technology package which include
technical data and human skills, are conveyed through an
interactive process of adjusting implanted producers and
equipment operation until the desired production
efficiencies and quality standards are achieved.
The effectiveness of technology transfers depends in
large part upon the absorptive capablities of the recipient
enterprise and the industrial environment in which it
operates, and to a lesser extent upon the transfer
capabilities of the technology supplier. A basic reason for
acquiring technology from another enterprise, rather than
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through one's own research and development, is that it is
generally much cheaper and quicker. This is the reason why
technology has become a "commodity" in world trade.
Another critical aspect relevant to international
technology transfer is the distinction between implanting
"operational" (turnkey) technology and imparting technical
capabilities to duplicate that technology, which, in some
cases, may lead to an indigenous capability to design and
engineer industrial systems. The Japanese have been
particularly successful in using licensing arrangements as
stepping stones to self-sufficient technological
capabilities, which were eventually used to develop new
generations of internationally competitive products,
processes, and production systems. Achieving worthwhile
results in the latter area depends, in part, on the state of
development of the recipient enterprise and supporting
industrial sectors.
D. INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS TO FACILITATE TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
1. Technology Transfer Corporation (TTC)
A major deficiency in the U.S. - Latin American
technology transfer is the lack of appropriate financial
mechanisms to bridge the gap between would-be (U.S.)
supplier firms unable or unwilling to become venture
capitalists and Latin American enterprises seeking
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technology packages which will meet the new sets of national
goals for technological development and which will increase
capabilities to diagnose technological adjustment problems
and participate in the adjustment and absorption process at
the enterprise level.
Most of the technology acquired by Latin American
enterprises from United States sources has been under
investment and licensing arrangements with U.S. firms. Most
of these are subsidiaries or joint venture companies. As can
be observed, the demands for technology have far exceeded
supplier response for a number of fundamental reasons
relating to the expanded role of the technology factor in
development
.
One of the reasons why the supply of technology from
American enterprise sources has been restricted is the fact
that only a limited number of U.S. firms are in a position
financially, and from a risk taking standpoint, even to
explore business opportunities in Latin America, let alone
to pay for technology transfer costs well in advance of
realized earnings. It may be several years before an
overseas business venture in a developing world country
breaks even and begins to yield a return. Even under
licensing arrangements without equity involvement there are
the risks, uncertainties and time delays associated with
royalty payments. Few licensor firms are in a position to
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incur the additional costs of technical support services
that may be associated with the successful implant of
operationally efficient industrial technology. These
additional costs involve adjustments in product designs,
production engineering, and in manufacturing practices,
which are typically required for particular market
conditions and operational environments.
Another factor inhibiting technology sales is the
reluctance of most banks to finance the "intangibles" of
technology acquisition (design, engineering, training, and
related manufacturing implant services) on both the
purchaser and supplier sides. Neither private commercial
banks nor government-sponsored development banks are
willing, or in some instances able, to lend for local
enterprise expenditures on technological upgrading. A new
set of financial mechanisms are needed which can accommodate
the categories of expenditures for "intangibles," apart from
the sale of capital equipment and for similar five-year
terms
.
On the other hand, the United States commercial
banks and the Export -Import Bank, by and large, do not
provide the short-term and medium-term supplier credit
needed for the type of technology transfer contracts
generally sought by Peruvian and Venezuelan enterprises, and
of course, by almost every Latin American enterprise.
121
Shortcomings and deficiencies in this regard are delineated
as follows:
1. A fundamental problem is that most U.S. commercial
banks are much more conservative than European or
Japanese banks in extending credit for foreign trade.
Their conservatism extends back to the U.S
Government -sponsored mechanisms intended to promote
export trade by the Export -Import Bank and the
associated Foreign Credit Insurance Agency.
2« The above mentioned financial conservatism is
especially pronounced when it applies to lending for
service intangibles, except where sales are associated
with the export of equipment and/or connected with
large scale construction projects. The reluctance to
lend for these purposes is traceable in part to
difficulties in the' defining and pricing of services
and in certifying delivery and adequate performance
under such contracts.
3. The size of loans associated with technology transfers
are small relative to machine and equipment purchases,
and the vetting of these contracts is more complicated.
Both of these factors contribute to increased unit
overhead costs for loan processing, and therefore
commercial banks tend to shy away from them.
The central objective of the proposed TTC
(Corporacion para la Transferencia de Tecnologia) would be
to expand involvement of U.S firms. It would be designed in
such a way as to accommodate the widespread demands in Latin
America, and other developing world nations, for
manufacturing know-how and related design engineering and
other technical support services without the management and
control normally involved in foreign investment by large
multinational firms.
The TTC would provide growth opportunities to a
broad spectrum of U.S. firms. Many of these firms are in
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need of financial resources to upgrade and expand existing
production lines which are no longer internationally
competitive, and they can use these additional earnings to
reinforce and to upgrade existing plant and equipment.
The proposed TTC is conceived as a small, autonomous
group organized as a joint corporation with members from the
United States and the countries involved in the Technology
Transfer process in order to promote, finance, and help
implement technology service exports. The TTC would operate
initially in selected projects, under cooperative agreements
negotiated with appropriate development banking
intermediaries. These cooperative groups would:
a. Determine technology survey requirements.
b- Develop project profiles of technology requirements.
c. Determine credit worthiness of local enterprise groups.
Among other functions, TTC would:
a. Translate these requirements into cost estimates for
required services.
b. Identify and select suitable U.S. enterprise candidates
to supply the required technology transfer services.
c. Make arrangements for field visits by U.S. firms to
complete contract arrangements.
d. Arrange for financing of project.
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2. Small Enterprise Development Corporation ( SEDC )
Urban and rural poor communities face particularly
difficult, and often intractable circumstances when it comes
to improving their economic conditions. Too often, overall
industrial expansion does little to benefit them through
increases of jobs, income, and needed goods. The
establishment of new enterprise forms, including
self-managed enterprises may be one way to give the poor new
access to decision-making and control of the means of
production, and consequent income- earning opportunities.
In other cases, it may prove possible to link
together small-scale enterprise or artisan groups to achieve
economies of scale in purchasing, marketing, distribution,
storing, bookkeeping, and for other
legal/technical/management services. These new enterprise
forms could reach large numbers of people with greater
effectiveness from a social development point of view. These
various new enterprise forms could provide additional
opportunities to increase productivity among this group of
income earners and to increase their share of income from
value added in production units.
A Small Enterprise Development Corporation
(Corporacion de Desarrollo de Pequenas Empresas), specially
staffed to reach into the sub-cultures of poor populations,
with an appropriate line of credit, may be one means to
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improve the earning power and security of the poor.
Traditional credit institutions, even those oriented to
small-scale enterprise, are ineffective in this area.
They are unable to assist in the indispensable task
of project formulation that an SEDC would be staffed to
undertake, and are either unable or unwilling to administer
the large number of small loans for numerous small projects
that are typical in this sector. Development banks generally
are unwilling to take the inevitable risks that characterize
this area. Special skills will be required to start these
projects and to monitor the experiments, until they reach a
point of viability, especially self-managed projects.
The SEDC with a structure similar to the TTC, would
operate as an autonomous public corporation with funding
from national and international sources. Its functions would
be:
a. To develop access and ties to urban poor communities,
with a view toward involving them in project
formulation and other steps in the decision process.
b. To establish appropriate linkages with public agencies
(national and international) that could provide
funding, programming or technical support.
c. To identify and help formulate projects for the poor.
d. To establish liaison with local agencies and groups
that can assist in project formulation and
execution-including training, technical support,
appropriate technology design, marketing, and other
necessary ancillary support services.
e. To monitor funded projects with a view toward improving
the impact of lending.
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f. To help syndicate loans with other lending institutions
for projects that have passed the incubation state.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
At no time in history has the human race been presented
with a challenge of the magnitude and complexity as the one
we are facing today, in a world where technology is a
dominant and primary factor.
Therefore, since we have no new frontiers to conquer we
must make the most efficient use of all the available
natural resources to support the needs and demands of our
countries
.
The only way to reach an acceptable standard and to
comply with the developmental objectives of Peru and
Venezuela is by means of an adequate and aggressive
technology transfer process primarily from the United States
which is the most developed and influential country on the
American Continent.
As has been established, there is a strong need to
review the actual policies and procedures regarding the
Technology Transfer process in order to utilize the
Technology factor as a pivotal element of national economic
growth and development.
Part of the problem that is being faced is the lag in
perceptions of a changing world. There is also a reluctance
on both sides to face up to the reality of change and to
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accept the necessity to reconcile differences if mutually-
destructive conflicts are to be avoided.
The basic purpose of this thesis has been to provide
insight and guidelines leading to practical arrangements
that will contribute to conflict resolution. Hopefully,
these suggestions will lead to realistic accommodations of
technological disagreements between the United States and
Peruvian and Venezuelan governments and enterprise that
apply also to Third World countries.
It is the authors expectation that the proposals made
for institutional arrangements should prove to be useful in
moving toward mutually advantageous courses of action rather
than continuing recriminations and mutually detrimental
behavior.
An additional note is worth remark. In the future the
research presented in this thesis, could be expanded through
the detailed study of the development and organization of
the proposed institutional mechanisms (Technology Transfer
Corporation and the Small Enterprise Development
Corporation) , and its application to both, the civilian and
military fields.
As the famous French general Charles de Gaulle once
remarked, "On s ' engage , et puis on verra."
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